A significant exercise will
take place right after the conclusion of the Dubai Airshow in the United
Arab Emirates. The Al Dhafra airbase will host teams of six AdA
Rafales, six USAF F-22As and six RAF Typhoons as well as the local UAE &
French squadrons (and also Pakistani F-16s but unconfrimed). This
is the first time that (officially that is) Rafales and F-22As will
participate in a large joint exercise such as the Advanced Tactical
Leadership Course (ATLC). Al Dhafra is a joint UAE and USAF base
and is the home of the majority of the Emirates F-16s and Mirage
2000-9s. The UAE Air Warfare Center was the very first tactical center
to be set up in the Middle East. It has been developed by the UAEAF
to conceive and evaluate combat tactics, an especially
important effort since the entry in service of large numbers of F-16s
and 2000-9s. Al Dhafra AWC is very similar in goal to two other major
tactical centers, Nellis AFB for Red Flag and
Florennes AB for TLP.
The goal of ATLC is to train forces in a multinational & large scale
exercise environment and raise the interoperability and the combat
effectiveness of the participating air forces by developing pilot
leadership skills while improving improving tactics, techniques and
procedures. ATLC typically lasts about four weeks and consist of large
scale exercises and training sorties designed to specifically improve
aircrew mission skills. Week three of the four week exercise
is typically dedicated to large scale night exercises.
So, this is a “routine” event, not the sensational duel reported by Le Point
magazine in France, and a good
opportunity for participating nations to improve joint operations. Note:
F-22s, although present, are reportedly not participating directly to
ATLC after all. This is so far confirmed by The Dew Line.
Revisit the very good flight test report from
Peter Collins and read why Rafale is
perhaps the best pure dogfighter currently in service. Our June 2009
research note is all about Combat Aircraft Market,
we remain very positive about the Rafale outlook, with a market
potential exceeding 300 aircraft to 2019, more if it clinches the
MMRCA deal in India. However, the Indian procurement is not
necessarily logical, and still heavily bureaucratically impacted.
While Rafale is the logical choice for India as a combat asset,
the packages put together by Lockheed Martin and Gripen Team are quite
impressive and attractive.
G2 Solutions and Teal Group to Present 2010 Forecast. See
Banner Below for information.
August 2009
Michel Merluzeau's Interview with NBC 5 Seattle(Click picture to launch the video)
July 2009
June 2009
UAVs and fuel cells
UAVs must have high persistence to be of
optimal value. Especially smaller UAVs used by soldiers on an "over the
next hill" basis. A 30 minute UAV does not help much - but 2 hours would
be very useful. Powering these devices is complicated.
Ron Stearns, research director at G2
Solutions explains all about what why
persistence is important in ISR. And why fuel cells are going to play a
critical role in the UAV business.
Michel Merluzeau addresses some of the issues
facing Airborne Surveillance in a 20 minutes podcast with Addison
Schonland of Innovation Analysis Group
The news from Somalia is getting lots of attention,
but there are other hot spots like the Malacca Straights. Pirates are as
dangerous and unpredictable as ever. The best way to keep track of
maritime piracy threats is from the air explains managing partner at G2
Solutions Michel Merluzeau. Michel describes the problems and various
aircraft in operation or under development and the kind of problems they
need to solve. The piracy threat is not going away and the assets needed
to mitigate against the threat cost much more than the pirates'
equipment. This is not a happy situation.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ Monday, April 6 press
conference offered surprises as well as some things long anticipated.
What seems apparent is
an unwillingness to deal with decades-long procurement cycles, as
budgets and threats are moving too quickly to maintain such a structure.
Part and parcel of this is a reset on programs attempting to leverage
leap-ahead technologies - whatever they may be. Gates’ comments on
technology readiness should be taken seriously, as should his concurrent
emphasis on a more rapid fielding of platforms and capabilities.
One needs only to look at the ABL and FCS programs as examples that
strayed from these evolving principles.
Program cancellations,
redirects and recompetes will continue to garner a great deal of press
coverage; their impacts appear immediate to their constituencies.
Look for a change in contract structures, perhaps to include a greater
number of firm, fixed price contract vehicles where appropriate, and
look for more scrutiny on the feasibility of “productizing” technologies
and delivering on schedule.
Gates has gone to great
lengths to explain (time and again) that his decisions were made without
regard to top-line DoD budgets or to their political and/or job related
impacts. “I tell you as I said yesterday, virtually every decision that
I announced yesterday I would have made regardless of what our top line
was. If our top line had been $581 billion, I would have made the same
decisions that I made and announced yesterday because they went to what
should be in the base budget; they went to program a rebalancing of
getting more of the irregular — the resources for irregular warfare into
the base budget; putting a cap on programs where there was no military
requirement for additional resources; and then killing programs where
the budget was out of control or they were overdue or the technology was
too great a risk,” Gates said in an April 7, 2009 Defense Media
Roundtable.
On a “programs
mentioned” basis, winners and losers are being singled out, and perhaps
rightfully so especially when Secretary Gates called out the FCS
contract vehicle in his April 6 News Briefing from the Pentagon:
“Further, I am troubled by the terms of the contract, particularly in
its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little
leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS
program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we
must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and
maturity of the technologies before proceeding further.”
So, in the short term,
Gates’ decisions on the following programs will positively or negatively
affect the following companies, although Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers
will also suffer/benefit:
1) VH-71 Presidential
Helicopter reset and recompete: Lockheed Martin
2) CSAR-X cancellation:
Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky all competed
3) TSAT program
cancellation: Boeing, Lockheed Martin
4) Cancellation of
second ABL aircraft: Boeing
5) Multiple Kill Vehicle
Program termination: Lockheed Martin
6) DDX to stop at three
ships with likely reopening of DDG 51 line: General Dynamics likely
hurt, Northrop Grumman to benefit
7) C-17 program, USAF
ends acquisition: Boeing
8 ) Future Combat
Systems, reset and recompete of vehicle portion: Boeing and SAIC
9) F-22, production to
end at 187 aircraft as planned: Lockheed Martin, Boeing
10) MDA, evolving
emphasis on theater and/or “rogue” threats: Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop
Grumman and Lockheed Martin - with the theater emphasis likely helping
Raytheon at the relative expense of others.
March 2009
COMAC 919, C-Series and KC-X: Traction
or Inaction?
Three great topics - all containing a fair amount of uncertainty -
with C-Series having finally turned a significant corner with
the firm Lufthansa order.
COMAC 919
The Chinese aerospace industry continues apace with its plans to
become a major regional and global player by the early 2020s. That does
not surprise us, as we have been on the record, especially during the
great tanker hysteria of the summer of 2008 stating that China, not
Europe was the main threat to the future of the US aerospace industry.
What to think then of the COMAC 919? Does one need to see this project
primarily as an effort to compete directly with Boeing and Airbus? We
think that one the consequential aspect of the project will be direct
competition with the two majors. However, as with all things Chinese,
one needs to look at long-term strategy, this long march (長征) towards
the rise of the middle kingdom as a new industrial and political hegemon.
Can 919 succeed? The short answer is yes and no. 919 will likely
establish a solid regional and domestic footprint, garner a few
overseas clients in countries linked politically and economically with
the PRC, and will be used as a bargaining tool for trade negotiations
and all sort of favors required by the communist government.
However, we do not believe this aircraft can come close to what Boeing
or Airbus plan to replace the 737 and 320 families. This is not even
close, so let's not go there.
What COMAC 919 will be is a clean sheet design, perhaps a glorified
C-Series or Superjet. Western content will of course be extremely high
with engines, avionics, electrical, and flight controls all provided by
traditional players. What COMAC will be as an organization is an
integrator, not a manufacturer. 919 will not be a creator of
technology, it will be a leecher; very much unlike what Seattle and
Toulouse have in mind (for 737/A320 replacement) which will be a
considerable technology evolution. P&W or CFM look set to supply
either GTF
or LEAP56 engines, and Thales and Rockwell Collins are in a strong position to
garner the avionics and flight controls project portions. In fact,
Thales might be in a better situation than Collins; its nose-to-tail
approach may fit project requirements better.
How many 919s could be operating in the world eventually? If the
aircraft is indeed successful, probably as many as 800-1000 919s could
be flying the Chinese skies by 2026. The rest of the world is an
entirely different issue.
C-Series
C110/130 are no more, it's all about CS100 and CS300 now. Yes, some
people I spoke to in the past year or so often looked confused when I
asked about the C130 passenger version; these are simply name/numbers
one should not reuse, and Bombardier got the message. The firming up of
the Lufthansa order, something many were obviously expecting, is
particularly timely in this environment given its significant
psychological value to Bombardier and the industry.
It also clearly sends the signal that customers have relative faith
in the design and timing. It also sends out a much needed message
at the macro level: this too (crisis) shall pass and BBD's timing will
coincide with a definite up cycle. In short, there is light at the end
of the tunnel and the sky is not falling.
KC-X Tanker
Unfortunately, we don’t see much light at the end of the oversized
tanker saga. Governments obviously do not function as efficiently as
the private sector in most cases, and the tanker is one perfect example
of inefficiencies and indecisiveness. That the newly enshrined Obama
administration decides to examine KC-X is perfectly reasonable, one can
expect it. News of a planned 5-year delay is rather surprising and plays
in favor of the Boeing company, or does it?
Let's assume that the Air Force customer has indeed changed its mind
(very unlikely), or has been forced to (likely). A 5-year delay changes
the equation entirely wherein we most likely say good bye to 767. In
five years time, 767/764 will be a nearly 35 year-old design. Think of
it this way (a rather extreme example but rather telling), it would be
like having the 1990 US Air Force buy 1955 KB-50 tankers. Again, the
example is extreme (and inaccurate to a large extend) , but why would
the Air Force settle for a product at the end of its life cycle that
will eventually prolong aging aircraft maintenance issues?
Boeing can and will do better. A 5-year delay could introduce two
new pieces to the equation, both formidable competitors: KC-777 and the
(highly) hypothetical KC-787. This respite will give Boeing some time
to refine engineering and develop the systems required for both
aircraft. Again, it all depends what USAF wants the aircraft to do
(KC-X vs KC-Y) and KC-30 still remains a very strong, and mightily
attractive candidate for the next five to ten years.
Of course, we think the five year delay won't happen, so may be
let's forget about the above . Boeing will likely push for it, but as
noted above, unless the tactical situation has changed dramatically in
the past few months, USAF will want to push forward with KC-X and
rightly so. Launching a competition now means that at best, the first
KC-4Xs will enter service in 2012-14. The Obama administration will
indeed have a lot of explaining to with its constituents and Members of
Congress if it goes ahead with the decision to delay tanker another five
years. What has changed? Not much in our opinion, so let's move
forward please.
Last year’s release of “The Challenge of
Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries” (Ochmanek-Schwartz) contains a very
interesting chapter simply entitled: “China’s Thinking on Escalation:
Evidence from Chinese Military Writings.”
Here are some of the author’s most interesting
comments as presented in their report:
The PLA’s current
modernization efforts—in stark contrast to past activities—have been
uniquely comprehensive, covering doctrine, force structure, and
training and education.
PLA writings on war control tend to be very
general and discursive in nature and provide limited insights into
actual PLA behavior during conflict.
A prominent argument in Chinese writings about
war control is that conflict is far more transparent in a globalized
world, and, thus, it is subject to national and international
limits—some of which constrain China and others that China would
seek to use to its advantage during conflict.
Chinese writings also discuss certain military
actions that pertain to containing warfare and creating favorable
conditions for China to prevail.
Chinese writings also emphasize the importance
of gaining the political and military initiative [争取主动] and avoiding
situations that could put China in a reactive, passive, or defensive
[被动] posture. PLA writings highlight how difficult and costly such
control is to regain once lost and specify a series of steps to
achieve and maintain initiative, including rapid reaction to
incipient crises, quick deployments, strong standing forces, solid
contingency planning, rapid mobilization of societal forces, a
resolute political stance, rapid generation to wartime postures, and
avoiding outsider intervention and the internationalization of the
situation.
PLA publications suggest that the Second
Artillery’s nuclear forces are postured, first and foremost, for
deterring nuclear attacks on China and preventing deterrence
failures (Second Artillery was chosen because the PLA has placed
significant emphasis on it in recent modernization efforts; in
particular, the Second Artillery’s conventional missile forces
will likely be used in future contingencies such as those over
Taiwan). For decades, this has been the main preoccupation of the
Second Artillery: possessing a credible capability to deter nuclear
aggression against China. However, if deterrence fails, PLA writings
clearly indicate that the Second Artillery would conduct retaliatory
strikes. It would do so, ironically, for the purpose of deescalation
and, perhaps, war termination. Second Artillery nuclear operations
are based on the assumption that China has already been hit with
nuclear weapons, and some explicitly state that the Second Artillery
is operating under “grim” nuclear conditions. Most Western analysts
of nuclear affairs regularly and, to some extent, rightly, dismiss
NFU (no first use) pledges as unreliable confidence-building
measures.
A further challenge for the Second Artillery is
how to respond to U.S. conventional missile attacks on Chinese
nuclear weapon support facilities or actual nuclear-capable
missiles. Under a narrow interpretation, such attacks would not
constitute nuclear first use and, therefore, would not justify a
Second Artillery nuclear counterattack campaign. Yet, the
possibility of suffering a disarming first strike by conventional
precision-guided weapons is clearly a source of concern for Chinese
planners, one that is currently being debated in Beijing. This
scenario directly calls into question the sustainability of China’s
current NFU policy in the face of advances in U.S. conventional
weapon technology.
China’s relative inferiority to the United
States in both space and general conventional military capabilities
may lead Beijing to consider offensive operations in space in an
effort to counter the United States’ comparative advantages.
According to an article in a leading Chinese military journal, “The
party with inferior military space forces will be unable to organize
a comprehensive and effective defense. It should therefore
concentrate its limited military space forces on the offensive.”
It is unclear whether Chinese strategists
recognize the inherent tension between their concept of using
nuclear counterstrikes for de-escalation and war termination and the
risks of inadvertent escalation.
February 2009
World Business and Personal Jets Avionics Market
to Recede Through 2011, With Recovery Anticipated Around 2012
The 48-page research note AB081 presents business jets and avionics
market analysis, including a detailed avionics market and systems
forecast from 2008 to 2020.
Business jets are essential, efficient and productive tools of the
modern global economy, but the current economic and financial crisis
places increasing cost pressures on owners and users alike. Major
losses in the US and European economies will impact the immediate
market outlook which could take five years to recover. Additionally,
recent politicians & media mischaracterization about business jets
has further affected the immediate outlook.
The new generation of aircraft introduced
since the late nineties has been a productivity multiplier, enabling
executives to reach customers and suppliers globally. At the core of
this revolution, integrated avionics systems have grown dramatically
in terms of their capabilities and reliability, providing unique
operating reach to users while significantly improving safety. This
nearly $2 billion annual market is witnessing rapid technology
changes that few companies can master entirely.
"While we have seen Garmin (NASDAQ:GRMN) emerging as a strong player
in the general aviation segment and personal jets markets, Rockwell
Collins (NYSE:COL) and Honeywell (NYSE:HON) will maintain their
control over the larger business jets categories. The only potential
threat to these two companies may come from an established avionics
player such as Thales (EPA:HO)," said Michel Merluzeau, G2
Solutions' Managing Partner.
While Honeywell and Rockwell Collins control well over 80% of the
forward-fit market, Thales might capture 5-10% of this segment by
2020. Universal Avionics, Esterline CMC Electronics (NYSE:ESL) , L-3
(NYSE:LLL) and Chelton Flight Systems have respective technological
and market strengths, but will find it difficult to migrate upmarket
as technology evolution and OEM cost pressures will continue to
increase.
"Universal Avionics will thrive in the aftermarket, but long-term
viability is questionable based on its current structure and product
offering," says Merluzeau. In the current environment, acquisitions
could accelerate especially among those companies hurt by the
Eclipse program collapse such as Avidyne and Innovative Solutions &
Support (NASDAQ:ISSC). The report confirms that industry should
brace for two to three very difficult years with deliveries expected
to drop at least 30 percent.
A cursory read through this document
speaks more to continuity than anything else, although the ordering,
emphasis and importance of DoD Core Mission Areas and Core
Competencies will provide the most enduring outputs. Another
interesting emphasis in the document
could be called Operations Other than War, or the application of
soft power, something that many interested onlookers have
anticipated from the new leadership at the Pentagon. To say
that the application of soft power is new with regard to the GWOT
would be a misnomer, as the strategy shift accompanying the “surge”
in Iraq also involved an increased use of soft power to bring
factions to the table. If nothing else, this document alludes
to an increasing of DoD responsibilities in stability and
reconstruction.
Here is a brief look at Core Mission Areas and
Core Competencies Core
Mission Areas:
1) Homeland Defense and Civil Support
2) Deterrence Operations
3) Major Combat
Operations
4) Irregular Warfare
5) Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations
6) Military Contribution to Cooperative Security
Core Competencies
1) Force Application
2) Command and Control
3) Battlespace Awareness
4) Net Centric
5) Building Partnerships
6) Protection
Our Winter 2009 Newsletter
can be downloaded directly here
This race is probably the most promising for Rafale, despite
formidable opponents, F-18E and Gripen, it looks to us that this is
most definitely Rafale’s to lose. Brazilian president Lula’s
comments (”I am very interested in this aircraft”) during his
meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy underscore the
strength of Rafale’s competitive position while Dassault’s chosen
partner, Embraer is key to any contract going to the Brazilian
military.
Will we see a different defense policy from the incoming US
Administration towards Brazil? Doubtful. It is also unlikely that
Brazil truly would find Washington to be a reliable defense partner
in Brasilia’s own terms. The Indian “syndrome”, namely the US
embargo on defense articles following the 1998 nuclear testing has
left scars with many emerging powers; not only in terms of what it
means as far as doing business with Washington, but especially how
it led many to become increasingly reluctant to associate their
national defense with US interests & conditions.
Markets considered safe in the past such as Thailand, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and even Japan have already or are at risk of turning away
from US products in favor of European or Domestic solutions. The
ball is clearly with the US government; it needs to adapt, listen
and accept more of our allies’ demands rather than impose them,
otherwise the addressable market for US companies will continue to
shrink. Singapore and South Korea were abnormal contracts by any
commercial definitions, these types of wins will become rare in the
future
Time for Northrop to act or risk
losing KC-X
It is time for a Northrop Grumman all-out offensive to ensure that
the political transition does not further degrade its tanker chances
With an Obama administration just around the corner,
defense programs will be scrutinized over the next few months, with
unavoidable ideological considerations getting in the way of immediate
end-user requirements. This is the nature of politics and politicians, a
combination often devoid of common sense and largely concerned with
career considerations. Despite Robert Gates retaining his job, there
will be some latency with key programs such as F-22 and KC-X.
Since the R. “Pontius P” Gates Tanker postponement
move last September, KC-X has fallen below the radar screen with the
notable exception of Northrop Grumman’s ad in the Washington Post,
which reportedly earned them a scolding from DoD officials (we won’t
question the merits), leaving only recently the limelight to American
Center for Progress (by name only). Rep John Murtha’s (D-USMC) recent
comments are symptomatic of the transitional lethargy that typifies any
changes in administration. Despite being closely involved in major
defense procurements, folks like Murtha love the grandstanding
opportunities to make a point. It is noteworthy how dynamic the
incoming POTUS has been since elected while tracking some radical policy
changes from the early days of his campaign. In typical pompous
fashion, Rep Murtha’s decision to wait a few more years for KC-X will
bring smiles in Washington state (our neighborhood) while it might raise
some concerns in Century City.
Time is exactly what Boeing needs to further develop
a competitive solution. Since we think Boeing’s best bet at this time
is to move with 767-400 to counter A330, this delay will help Boeing
optimize the airframe for the tanker mission and give them a much
stronger shot at winning the prize. The bigger 767-400 has not shined
against A330 in the commercial world, but again, we are not dealing with
commercial issues when it comes to the tanker mission, something that
both bidders need not to forget.
In short, we think Northrop Grumman is at risk of
losing the initiative, and thus losing KC-X even before the new RFP is
being issued. An EADS win will be politically unacceptable for an Obama
administration, especially at a time where the US economy is being hit
by the most severe recession since the 1920s. President Obama risks an
open rebellion if he allows another Northrop Grumman/EADS win. Even if
the EADS footprint grows in the South and helps the US economy greatly,
the selective media distillation of the story will always portray Boeing
as the victim and Northrop Grumman as the villain.
Journalists often have a way of selectively
reporting information that suits their agenda rather that reporting
information objectively. While on the topic of journalists, let’s
quickly mention the Flight International incident last week, which will
undoubtedly be used by Northrop/EADS opponents to argue the case that
EADS cannot be trusted with some DoD work, which is an
oversimplification of course but makes for great media headlines.
Now Boeing has a unique chance, after losing the
competition twice already (once was not on the merit of the solution,
the second time was), to finally maintain control over USAF tanker
program and put a serious dent in the EADS North American expansion
plans. As the French say “Jamais deux sans trois”, but this delay will
be especially welcome in Seattle. 764 is a much stronger and capable
aircraft, one that might be good enough to make this round even closer
than the last one. Hopefully, USAF will proceed with a fly off, so that
concerns about both aircraft can be addressed and real performance data
can be presented to decision makers. If Boeing does indeed proceed with
764, we see the chances of a split significantly decreasing, as the
narrowing of the aircraft performance would make a split even more
unattractive to the customer.
With Boeing fixing the 787, a program still mired
with significant uncertainties in our opinion, the 767 might be the only
option for a while. Now what can Northrop do to ensure reasonable
chances of winning? It basically needs to continue pushing the issue
on the Hill, ensuring that the message about KC-30 is clear and perhaps
migrating more work in states that have been traditionally friendlier to
the Boeing company (just a little note of fantasy, it would be
interesting if EADS migrated work in the Seattle area). Perhaps
Northrop could also use some time, from a political standpoint, as there
is no way to predict what the next round of elections are going to be
like. Although the democrats are on a high, the cyclicality could be
abruptly down in the next round of elections if the GOP can get its
message right (doubtful) and if the recession continues to drag well
into 2010 (possible). This, when coupled with a few geopolitical
hotspots could mean some serious troubles. This does not suggest that
a Republican congress will significantly enhance Northrop’s chances, but
it is noteworthy to state that no Democratic members of Congress have
really been vocal about supporting Northrop Grumman, perhaps with the
exception of the representatives from the LA Basin who might have paid
lip service to this issue when in fact they should have been more vocal
in their support for the local player.
Can Northrop push a lease option? Perhaps this
would be an interesting option to get USAF to sign on as quickly as
possible, however, the risks and cost to the end user are significant.
The other option on the table might come from NATO, but the economic
slowdown is going to put a serious dent in major program decisions.
Boeing has regained the initiative and can be better
prepared for this third round of the KC-X competition. Overall, we
think they have the right mix at this time. Northrop Grumman only has
the best aircraft.
Here you have it, it’s all about the politics and
that makes it even more illogical.
October 2008
Is there a future for the Aerospace industry
in Washington State? Of course there is, but it will take vision and
commitment from all sides to slow down the current tide
The Boeing post strike debate is going full speed by now. We have given
our views to several media outlets about what we believe is the
essential take away from the third longest running strike in Boeing’s
history. To summarize it simply, we think this is a strategic win for
Chicago (although their spokesman likes to insist that nobody wins in
those affairs). Unions have obtained important concessions, some of
which are undoubtedly big wins for their members; however, when all is
set, measured and done they won a small victory with the micro issues,
whereas the corporation has won the macro battle.
Now some in the industry (hello Richard) are predicting a bleak future
for the Seattle area aerospace industry and I quote him in his
latest
monthly letter “Aircraft clusters are fragile” and” The
Puget Sound aviation cluster won’t be moved in one giant piece; rather,
like every other ex-cluster, it will disaggregate." We do not
fundamentally disagree with Richard at all, in essence, the strike has
further damaged labor/management relations and reignited an already
intense debate within BCA on which type of business and production
models would better serve the organization in the future.
So, what about those clusters that everybody seems to be so interested
about? Aircraft design and production is faced with two major issues:
an overall increasing division of labor and rising global competition
within the next two decades. Aerospace clusters as we know them now
will remain; it is their shape and role within the greater aerospace
marketplace that will be reshaped by market considerations and
programmatic decisions.
The Seattle area aerospace industry will not disappear, I am prepared to
bet on that. However, its shape, role and overall importance within the
Boeing organization will certainly change considerably over the next two
decades. The 787 model has taught us a few very interesting things
about aircraft manufacturing, the most important being that it takes a
fair amount of highly skilled individuals to put together the many parts
that fly you and me closely in formation to whatever our destination may
be. Lesson # 1: an experienced workforce is an incredibly valuable
asset, lesson #2: to reassemble it somewhere else is a momentous, time
consuming and expensive task.
That is why Boeing will act prudently about the direction (physical and
business) it wishes to take about aircraft production. This is not
trivial at all, some would say you can find machinists and engineers
many places in the US and the world: true, but the concentration and
talent found in those clusters is hard to match and is invaluable to any
organization, plain and simple. What is at risk for the Seattle Area?
For now and the next 5-7 years not much should change. Boeing has a
healthy (albeit moderately inflated backlog for its 737NG and production
for 787 will ramp up from late 2009. Now, is there life for the Renton
site after 737? The best answer is that we do not know, but the answer
is: probably not as much as there is now.
How Boeing will handle its next generation narrowbody and 777
replacements is up in the air right now. There will be a fair amount of
outsourcing for sure, but I would expect Boeing to bring back a
significant amount of engineering and design in house to ensure that
programs do not experience the glitches encountered with 787. In all,
yes, Boeing’s footprint in the Seattle Area will shrink but it will
transform rather than disappear. It will ultimately be a more balanced
organization in the area with, on one end, production and assembly
shrinking as work migrates out of states, and one the other end, fewer
workers required to assemble the aircraft as new integration
processes change the way Boeing builds those in its Seattle area
facilities. Results: increased
efficiency+distribution of labor=fewer workers=reduced footprint=leaner
assembly process. Design/engineering/flight testing will stay here for
the foreseeable future but some additional component production, if not
the final assembly altogether, might migrate toward "preferred" southern
and central states as well as Boeing overseas’ partners.
It is also up to Federal and State politicians to ensure that a
conducive business climate, one that is lighter on bureaucracy, reduced
union influence, taxes and regulations, encourages Boeing to work with
WA and US partners. If WA can rethink its business climate, then Boeing
might not be the only company willing to expand its activities in the
Pacific Northwest. The status quo, "them vs. us" is simply not
acceptable.
Boeing still on strike:
Boeing
and the machinists union agreed to return to the negotiating table in an
effort to end the now 36 day long strike. So far little to no progress
is to be reported.
NBAA 2008: Attendance was
marginally lower than in 2007 in Atlanta but overall the business
aviation pulse remains strong. Focus will be on execution in the
next few years as the financial meltdown resulting from the global
credit crisis will eventually impact business aviation.
Gulfstream introduces the G250: The battle
for new midsize is on, The G250 promises to deliver strong range
and speed performances (3,400 nautical miles at Mach .80) with one of
the largest cabin in its class. G250 comes standard with the now
bug free Honeywell PlaneView250.
Eclipse's minimalist presence in Orlando:
Eclipse's presence was noticeably reduced from the previous years of
lavishness, irrational exuberance and glitz. Only two aircraft and
a small reception desk made for quite the spartan approach at this year's
NBAA. Eclipse is logically cutting on cost in an effort to
survive, which is still debatable at this point.
Lockheed VH-71 First Flight:
The first flight of an operational pilot-production example has
taken place at the AgustaWestland factory in Yeovil, England, on
September 23. The aircraft will be flown to NAS Patuxent River, MD for
modifications.
Taiwan needs for additional F-16s ignored by
US? The US DoD has announced plans to sell 30
Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters worth $2.5 billion, upgrade
packages for Taipei's four Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye AEWC aircraft, and spares for the RoCAF Lockheed
F-16A/B and Northrop F-5 combat aircraft. Regrettably, still no
progress is reported with the sale of additional F-16s. Taiwan
might therefore have to look elsewhere for new aircraft.
Next week: Focus on an Obama
administration: with polls now clearly favoring Senator Obama, we
will take a look at his Defense platform and potential players in his
administration.
September 2008
Back to square one
The decision to cancel the KC-X RFP altogether is a
significant blow to USAF and may inflict serious damage to Boeing-Air
Force relations for decades. This cancellation also means that a
winner will likely not emerge until 2010 at best and that the first
KC-45 tankers will most probably enter service around 2015. The future
of Mobile as an aerospace hub is also in doubt for the time being.
Boeing's fought hard to maintain its monopolistic position in North
America and seems to have won a significant battle for now.
Secretary Gates' decision is first and foremost a
political one. It removes a potentially (although incorrectly
identified as such) damaging issue for Senator John McCain ahead of the
November election. Although the democrats will be able to use John
McCain's role in the cancellation of the first KC-X award, it gives
Boeing's supporters in Congress a weaker case to argue. What
Gates' decision also does is reinforce the view that the acquisition
process is no longer functioning in the best interest of the customer;
in short, politician’s special interests and roles must be reduced to a
more objective and realistic level, otherwise warfighters will continue
to be penalized.
It is clear to us that KC-X part 3 (or whatever
USAF decides to name it) will not be easier especially with a potential Obama administration who is seen to favor the Boeing
bid and whose position on the issue has followed a disappointingly
partisan line. Whoever leads our next administration needs to make
this program an absolute priority.
Boeing's options are still limited but somewhat
improved, however, it is undeniable that Boeing can claim much from SecDef Gates' decision:
- A win: BA has won a reprieve to prevent Airbus
from establishing a production footprint in the US. This was the
key issue.
- Time to propose a revised tanker aircraft if the
RFP is not radically altered: either 764 or 777 are the most logical
options now
- A way to further influence the requirements of
the customer
While Boeing is clearly getting a last minute
break, Northrop Grumman can also further polish the offering and make
KC-30 an even stronger proposition. If USAF decides to proceed
with only a slightly revised RFP, NGC and its suppliers can put forward
the A330F version and give the aircraft more range and fuel offload
capabilities. The question of GenX re-engining has been addressed
before and we do not believe this is yet an option for USAF, although
this might eventually change.
For Boeing, the choice is now about the aircraft
that will lead the company's third attempt at winning the program.
We however do not believe that USAF requirements will change so
dramatically that suddenly 777 will become a perfect shoe in for KC-X.
It never was. 777 is 45% larger than KC-30, it is more expensive,
it needs more ramp space and runway requirements are significantly
higher than 767 and 330.
The critical element in all this is that USAF needs
to forget about the past. The only way to avoid feeding future
protests is to make very clear that this will be an entirely new
contest, and a capability replacement program, not a platform
replacement. The Air Force can then clearly define what it wants from
the tanker based on needs and not based on suppliers 'own definitions of
what tanker should be doing. The comparative KC-135/KC-767 has plagued
the entire competition and has given Boeing critics plentiful
ammunition. At this point, the subject of which aircraft will be
better suited becomes irrelevant until the new RFP is available.
It could make 777 the perfect fit, or even A340 or A350 for that matter.
As we said, Pontius Pilate lives and his name is Robert Gates.
The Week in Review: September 5
Unresolved contract
issues at Boeing: A strike
will be costly for everybody. Boeing will lose in the area of
$100-$120 million per day, 787 first flight will be delayed to 2009 and
with the Seattle Rain Festival running for most of Q1, this might have
an effect on flight testing albeit a minor one. The big losers in
this strike will be the unions. Striking will only rightly encourage
Boeing management to proceed with plans to consider alternative sites
for the NextGen Narrowbody program and even consider subcontracting
larger portions of the work to Japanese suppliers. The 787
assembly model, despite all the initial problems makes clear business sense and
will eventually work out just fine.
Bombardier's results, back in the black: This is
good news for the Montreal region however, Q400 sales are a direct
consequence of oil prices, and not so much due to a visionary market strategy on the part
of Bombardier. Still one can only appreciate the irony, a few
years back pundits were already preparing for the end of the regional
turboprops. Not yet.
The SAAB Gripen team offer to the Koninklijke Luchmacht:
That is a seriously disruptive offering right there.
Sure, Gripen is nowhere near F-35 projected capabilities over time, but
do the Dutch really need it? It all comes down to the role the
Netherlands expect to play in the future of the alliance and what makes
good sense from an industrial standpoint. Gripen has strong potential in
several markets, but the Dutch will be better off overall sticking with
F-35 over the long run.
US Presidential elections: an article in DoD Buzz
has outlined some of the priorities of the Obama campaign. A quick
analysis of this article leads us to conclude that there is far more to
worry about in an Obama administration in terms of political and
bureaucratic interference. Few names impress
us in that team with the notable exception of the excellent Pierre Chao
and of course, Dr. William Perry.
Mitsubishi and Boeing joint efforts on the MRJ:
this shows us that the Japanese manufacturer gets it. If, as we
expect they turn out a really capable regional airliner, coupled with
Boeing’s unique capabilities and customer reach, this will certainly put
some serious pressure on Bombardier and Embraer. The CRJ-1000 will
likely be the first victim.
And finally, everybody's favorite topic, the
tanker program: Anything worth mentioning this week? Yes,
the comments from AMC CO General Lichte: "We need a new tanker now. I
don’t care which one it is. And we need to get on with this quickly.”
This is a welcome statement and also perhaps sends a message to Boeing
not to expect an additional six months to put forward a new aircraft. It
is clear that USAF has priorities driven by the realities on the ground,
or the air in that case.
This just in: the Boeing strike is on. This
could mean bad
news for the future of the Seattle workforce.
August 2008
July 2008
Chinese Long Term Naval Strategy:
Bases in the South Pacific?
The ever expanding influence of China as a political
and military force is often mentioned as an issue of concern when it
comes to the Taiwan strait. However, the Chinese are also attempting to
expand their military sphere of influence, further sharpening the
disconnect between their "stated" intentions and real world facts. With
France increasingly looking to disengage from its former colonies in the
Pacific, Tahiti and New Caledonia by 2015-2018, China has actively begun
to influence politics and politicians in the area.
While the US is keeping watch on the situation, a CRS report in 2007
lamented: "Some experts suggest that the United States should pay
greater attention to or more directly engage the Southwest Pacific. In
some Pacific Island countries, weak political and legal institutions,
corruption, civil unrest, and economic scarcity could lead to “failed
states” and/or become springboards for terrorism". Additionally, the
report states that, "Some specialists argue that China’s main objectives
in the Southwest Pacific are to check and reverse Taiwan’s diplomatic
inroads and to garner influence but not replace the United States as the
regional hegemonic power. Others argue that China has devised a
comprehensive strategy to take advantage of waning U.S. interest in the
region since the end of the Cold War, especially in Melanesia."
Those statements would be anecdotal at best if this were just another
report concocted by some talented analyst buried somewhere in SE. DC.
However, facts on the ground, particularly in Tahiti suggest that there
is indeed a concerted Chinese effort to become, over time, the leading
island trade and political partner, taking over from France. China is
particularly interested in gaining access to Papeete's port facilities,
currently used by the French Navy and Faaa's 11,000ft runway.
Combined with increased trade, China will continue its effort of
corrupting and buying local officials in the autonomous French
territory. France and the US in particular must pay particular attention
to this worrisome development.
C-Series: Soft Launch
Bombardier's
Farnborough announcement came as a surprise to no one. This was
basically the only "prestige" venue available to Bombardier for a launch
in 2008. The surprise, and frankly our disappointment, comes
from a borderline mediocre product launch.
What is this limited
LoI (letter of Intent) from Lufthansa telling us? Are operators
waiting for a frozen configuration before committing? Quite possibly.
Are Chinese companies going to announce orders toward the end of the
year? This is a likely scenario.
Launch orders are
indicative of many things; however, the apparent lack of enthusiasm for
the product at a trade show must not be interpreted as a definite sign
of product weakness. This does not apply to the C-Series, which
has all the ingredients to become a relatively successful product.
However, C-Series’ “poor” showing at Farnborough might be due to a few
issues that Bombardier needs to address. There are elements
completely outside of Bombardier’s control such as potential US airline
customers’ precarious financials. It might take a couple of years before
we see orders from US companies based on a still speculative recovery
curve.
Bombardier is
especially taking risk with its Chinese partnership, and this move is
possibly dissuading some customers from moving forward at this point.
Consequently, there might be a fair amount of wait and see from the
marketplace to assess how Chinese suppliers initially execute their
workshare. This waiting period will help establish a comfort
level, if any, on this issue. While we think Bombardier (BBD) is making
a fundamental mistake outsourcing the work to Shenyang, this is
primarily a financial decision; BBD does not have much choice if it
wishes to move forward in time with the program. However, if execution
on the part of Shenyang is not on par with expectations, the
consequences for the program could be serious, as is the transfer of
intellectual property (IP) to a likely future competitor. Chinese
companies have a poor track record in this area and will likely continue
to violate agreements despite assurances to the contrary.
Second, there might be
some leftover PR damages from the Q400 saga last fall. Despite being
vindicated on the issue, BBD has some ways to go before customers' full
confidence in the company is restored. Furthermore, BBD needs to
work on improving supplier relations if C-Series is to run as smoothly
as possible, as there is still plenty of discontent from suppliers
working with Bombardier on other programs. Indeed, it is the
supply chain that will make or break this program; Bombardier has the
right product concept and the market should respond positively. C-Series
can move the company to Tier 1 supplier status but there is little built
in margin, perhaps a year, at most two to fully maximize the entry into
service (EIS) opportunity
window.
C-Series is also
largely dependent on the success of P&W’s GTF engine program; if all
works well, then we have a winner. If P&W experiences delays or
problems (quite unlikely) with the engine, then the C-Series opportunity
window will evaporate and get pushed closer to other OEM aircraft entry
in service dates. Any delays could then intensify the
competitive environment and lead to order losses for BBD.
While Rockwell Collins
selection was expected, its Fusion is a very impressive avionics suite,
we are surprised that BBD has not selected Thales for avionics and
flight control systems. Thales has a strong nose to tail solution
in that domain, and the presence of Thales Canada in the Montreal area
could have been a benefit to BBD during the program development and
testing phases.
Finally, it is also
likely that the marketplace is waiting to see what Embraer is prepared
to do in response to C-Series. Despite all the “vagueness” coming
out of São José on the issue, we do not see Embraer sitting idle and
conceding this market segment to BBD. Bombardier has opted to
target a specific market segment (100-145 pax); it is possible that
Embraer will decide to focus on a higher capacity aircraft together with
another (European) partner.
Embraer also has the
advantage of being able to respond with a design that may benefit from
advances in technologies if it chooses to wait for the second half of
next decade to introduce its new product. Overall, we think that
Embraer’s response to the C-Series could be a much stronger offering and
we have more confidence in Embraer’s ability to execute a new program if
it partners with established aerospace OEMs in Europe and North America.
Additionally, and despite the potential of the C-Series with US
carriers, few have expressed strong interest for the aircraft and are
instead planning to procure additional 737s/320s to replace older
MD-80s-DC-9s types. This current approach provides airlines with
enough operational flexibility as the market eventually recovers from
its current downturn.
The key positive from the Farnborough launch is Lufthansa. Bombardier
might yet announce further airline commitments in the near future but to
gain the initial backing (as expected) from a well established and solid
operator such as the German airline was indeed critical to the overall
program initial perception.
June 2008
Now what?
GAO has spoken, but we are still no closer to a final resolution of
what is best described now as the tanker
soap opera.
While we felt the Boeing protest had indeed several merits on the
technicalities, we still believe a lengthy recompete is unnecessary and
might actually lead to further legal complications that would further
delay the delivery of these critical aircraft to USAF.
If there is indeed to be a recompete,
KC-30 remains the more capable
aircraft when compared with
KC-767.However, some have hinted that Boeing would now offer the
777, which could be a very
attractive option to the customer, albeit perhaps too much aircraft for
the mission as currently defined by USAF. (Perhaps a reason or two why
777 was not offered in the first place).Let’s not forget that the issue at stake here is goes beyond the
lucrative tanker contract and is actually an extension of the
Boeing-Airbus turf battle.
Some will now argue, and perhaps we share most of their feelings,
that Boeing won a political battle while not proposing a product to the
customer that could equal A330 mission performance... When one examines
the GAO decision, it remains clear to us that our evaluation of the
contest in December 2007
was indeed close, let’s look at the five criteria as presented by USAF:
Mission capability:This is
the key criterion and USAF was reportedly not entirely clear with this
metric.If USAF decides to
rewrite those metrics, it might lead to more confusion and feed future
protests.However, it also
is clear that the customer perception of mission capabilities was
perhaps altered for the better during the competition.While USAF might need to tweak this to reflect lessons learned, how it
will proceed with the evaluation will remove any doubts as to which
company has the better product.
Our view:
December: KC-30 Wins
Now: KC-30 wins the recompete
Proposal Risk.
USAF found that the two proposals had a similar level of risk.
Risk can be based on technical approach, estimated cost, teaming
arrangements and all factors that can intervene in the overall risk
perception.
Our view:
December: KC-767 Wins
Now: KC-767 wins the recompete
Past performance: Boeing lost to the
Northrop Grumman-EADS team. The simplistic argument that Boeing has
built the majority of the current tanker fleet cannot be entirely used
as a past MOP. It appears that GAO had no significant issues with how
the Air Force applied this criterion.
Our view:
December: Northrop Grumman slightly ahead
Now: Northrop Grumman
wins the recompete
Cost/price: This is apparently where USAF made several mistakes with cost estimates
and life cycle costs.A
recompete will be instrumental in devising better cost measurements and
strategies.This is
Boeing’s Achilles heel in spite of public proclamations on A330’s
increased fuel consumption over the life of the weapons system.
Our view:
December: Northrop Grumman wins
Now: Northrop Grumman wins the recompete
Integrated
Fleet Air Refueling Assessment:Boeing will say that this was applied unrealistically.However, USAF scenario modeling will remain classified for
obvious reasons and GAO is unlikely to have shed valuable insight.Even if IFARA modeling was partially
flawed, USAF’s response to GAO on the issue in May was perfectly
reasonable, and while numbers can be manipulated in favor of either
platform, realistic scenarios will be crucial, as they will demonstrate
that tanker ops in the pacific will require a longer range, heavier
aircraft such as KC-30 or KC-777.
Our view:
December: Boeing Wins
Now: Tie
What can USAF do now? Ignore GAO?This perhaps would set a dangerous precedent going against the
best interest of future procurement processes.Split the award between the two bidders?This option might eventually materialize. While involving
significant added costs, a split buy may have proven a way to avoid all
this government waste in the first place (see our January entry on the
topic).
The Boeing camp has won a significant battle, as we had mentioned
earlier in March, Boeing’s reasonable points have proven valid to GAO,
but again, those are technicalities with the procurement process,
nothing to do really with which aircraft is better suited for the
mission.USAF needs to move
quickly with a recompete and provide all resources necessary to announce
a final selection by end of 2008.Neither Boeing nor Northrop Grumman should continue to receive
funding until a final decision has been made.
There is something fundamentally wrong at times with
some elements of the media. A recent story in the German press claims
that the A350 is about eight tons over initial weight targets.
While this come as no real surprise to us, it however is not the weight
problem that really is interesting, but the increasing voracity of the
media to jump on any story for the sake of a story. News travel
very fast in the internet age, and what was previously considered
anecdotal is now positioned as news with little to no analysis or
research behind it. As for A350, now 6-7 years from her entry in
service, it is somewhat expected that initial designs would come higher
than planned. If the aircraft is indeed suffering from weight
issues, Airbus will now work with suppliers to find ways to meet more
aggressive weight targets while making the necessary improvement with
the aircraft carbon fiber fuselage barrel design. With oil hopefully at
half its current price around 2015, aircraft weight might not be as
critical as it is now... Time to take a longer term perspective, not
just with 350, but also with C-Series, MRJ and the rest...
A reminder of what lies ahead for Airbus,
Bombardier and Boeing...
It will take some time for the Chinese aerospace
industry to get up to par with western standards and manufacturing
efficiencies and procedures. However, G2 Solutions' experience
with China leads us to suggest that the ramp up will accelerate, and
that it will much faster than what some might have suggested in previous
years. While we are not talking of dog years, we would not
be surprised if China makes an attempt to develop that 150-200 pax
aircraft by the end of next decade to propose a solution, albeit
inferior to Airbus and Boeing's new narrowbodies. Even if by that
time China is not able to compete on the same levels in terms of
evolutionary technologies and especially will lag behind in terms
customer support and service, price positioning will allow them to take
some minimal market share away from Toulouse and Seattle in what we
believe will initially be "political" purchases. With the Chinese
government able to exert political and financial pressures on potential
buying countries, the Chinese domestic market alone will support product
growth, with the real threat materializing between 2025 and 2030.
By that time, Alabama will look like a real nice place to live and
work...
April 2008
Guessing Game...
With all the talk about Airbus and the GTF option for
the 320 upgrade, here is a slide we put together early last fall to
discuss some of the options available to the two major aircraft OEMs.
Some of the terminology might have changed since, but it clearly
highlights, in our opinion, that Airbus might have the upper hand as far
as the timing of upgraded/new products. However, as we all know,
what looks good and promising now might be an altogether different story
in five years time. With an economic slowdown clearly affecting
the market, Boeing might be able to delay the 737RS enough to
match the new Airbus narrowbody innovations.
Northrop Grumman awarded BAMS contract
DoD Announcement:
The Department of the Navy announced today that the
Northrop Grumman Corp. has been awarded the system development and
Demonstration (SDD) contract for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
Unmanned Aircraft System (BAMS UAS). The BAMS UAS contract award is
the culmination of a year-long source selection process since the Navy
received industry proposals in May 2007. The $1.16 billion
cost-plus-award-fee contract is to develop a persistent maritime
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data collection and
dissemination capability that fulfills the maritime war fighter's
requirement for continuous battle-space awareness. The BAMS UAS will be
developed using Northrop Grumman's RQ-4N platform. "This announcement
represents the Navy's largest investment in unmanned aircraft systems to
date. The extraordinary efforts leading to this announcement have
helped the BAMS UAS program begin to develop a persistent ISR capability
never before available to the fleet," said Capt. Bob Dishman, program
manager for the BAMS UAS program. "This is a significant milestone for
the BAMS UAS program, concluding a deliberate and meticulous source
selection process that adhered to stringent Federal Acquisition
Regulation and Naval Air System Command source selection processes and
documentation requirements." The BAMS UAS is an integral part of the
maritime patrol and reconnaissance Force. As an adjunct to the P-8A
Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, the BAMS UAS will provide persistent
maritime and littoral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to
joint forces and fleet commanders worldwide. This capability will
enhance battle-space awareness, improve force projection capabilities
and protect and defend the fleet and the nation.
The Last of the Bandits
Today will mark the end of major era of military
aviation history. F-117A will officially be retired at ceremonies
at Holloman AFB and Palmdale, CA. The four ship flight will then
head north to their original base on the Tonopah test range, in the
North West corner of the Nellis Range. There, they will stored in
the original hangars that were built in 1982 to house the first
operational 117 squadron. With the entry in service of F-22A and
other exotic new manned or unmanned platforms, the days of the Nighthawk
were indeed numbered. Here are some of the individuals who had a
significant role in the emergence of the first operational stealth
aircraft in the world:
- Ben Rich, Lockheed Aircraft
- Denys Overholser, Lockheed Aircraft
- Dr William J. Perry, Former DoD Engineering Chief and later
Secretary of Defense
- Senator Samuel Nunn, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee
and many more...
Two KC-10s, the Moon and a PDLCT
This is not the title of a new Chronicle but rather
an interesting airborne combination courtesy of NATO air forces joining in the
skies over central Asia. The Mirage 2000D crew has got some
interesting creative flair...Almost looks like those two USAF KC-10s are
on their way to the moon.
It's a long Road...
There’s no question the elusive first Rafale export
sale is getting closer and closer but the buyer seems to be changing
every six months. Morocco collapsed last year, Libya emerged as the
next likely buyer shortly thereafter, but since then things have gone
very quiet. Russia has reportedly offered a deal to Libya for a
squadron of Su-35 including a full weapons package. This could be an
advantage since France has apparently not included MICA in the pending
Rafale transaction. Recent information circulating in the French media
is now suggesting that the UAE is at an advanced stage of negotiation
with Dassault for the procurement of 20-30 Rafales to replace or
complement its fleet of remaining Mirage 2000s (upgrades near completion)
and 2000-9s (Bader 21 agreement). The deal could also involve the transfer of the 2000s to a
potential buyer with India reportedly expressing strong interest. It however remains unclear as to which aircraft will be sold.
Transferring the 2000-9s to India would be a strong signal that Delhi is
leaning Rafale for the MRCA tender and is using the -9s as a bridge to
Rafale since both aircraft share common modular avionics and some other
systems, including part of the weapon system. To date India has only expressed interest in upgrading its
2000s to the -5 standard; procuring -9s would lead to a hybrid fleet of
2000s, however a switch to -9s could perhaps be on the table (the 2000-9
is a suped up -5, the type difference is not a stumbling block). It is
also not clear if the UAE AF would decide to keep some of the newer -9s and sell
the remaining aircraft to India. Judging by the recent announcement
that France will have a permanent base in the UAE soon, this bit of news
seems rather logical and perhaps represents the strongest Rafale lead
since…ever. With the rumored announcement of a Greek AF buy for a
squadron of Rafale reportedly imminent, this could be the year Rafale
makes it to the big league.
Photo: Dassault Aviation
GAO Report: Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
From GAO :
This report is GAO's sixth
annual assessment of selected weapon programs. Since 2000, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly doubled its planned investment
in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion in 2007, but
acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and schedule have not improved.
Total acquisition costs for major defense programs in the fiscal year
2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent from first estimates, compared
with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have also often failed to deliver
capabilities when promised. DOD's acquisition outcomes appear
increasingly suboptimal, a condition that needs to be corrected given
the pressures faced by the department from other military and major
nondiscretionary government demands. This report provides congressional
and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment
of defense programs, identifying potential risks when a program's
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from best practices. The
programs assessed--most of which are considered major acquisitions by
DOD--were selected using several factors: high dollar value, acquisition
stage, and congressional interest. This report also highlights overall
trends in DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative
experience of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually
under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his
own initiative.
A few interesting articles
have caught our attention lately. The first one,
published in Airline Business is a remarkably rational piece from
Doug Parr, Greenpeace's chief scientist. His point about biofuels
cannot be contradicted; it's a fact, they will do more harm than good.
The environmental zealotsmafia litigation lobby now needs to come up with
practical solutions besides "airplanes are bad", and moderate their
(ideological not factual) view that global
warming climate change is primarily due to business and
commercial aviation growth. The solution lays with scientific
research, and from our point of view, it begins with more aggressive MPG
for every car in the Western World, a minimum of 35-40 MPG by 2015
seems reasonable enough.
Then there is
this
article in Human Events which raises a very troubling point if
indeed correct. If, as suggested by the article, the Integrated
Fleet Air Refueling Assessment (IFARA) model is partially flawed, this
might have helped KC-30 and penalized KC-767. We do not have the details
and the AF most likely has a reasonable explanation, but this could have
some traction, though probably not enough to reopen the competition.
General Chuck Horner (USAF Ret) often brings clarity
to complex situations. He proves it again with this (refreshing) piece
for NR Online. We do not entirely agree with him about France's
intentions vis a vis the CFM-56 engines. Commercial considerations and the
fact that a good chunk of the A320s flying in the world since 1988 use that engine
are the key reasons for France's "good behavior". Add to this the fact that the entire KC-135FR
fleet in service with the French Air Force also uses the above mentioned
engine. The list could go on and on.
Graham Warwick of Flight International recently
listed this "bipartisan" blog about the tanker program. This site does
little in terms of new and/or pertinent information. Still, we
would "recommend" it as a read for those interested in trying to
understand how some on the Hill and K Street are trying to influence or
interpret Boeing's protest.
The Center for a New American Security
(CNAS) and Foreign Policy Magazine Health and Future of the U.S.
Military Survey Results
Very interesting & revealing read (click on image to
be redirected to Foreign Policy's website)
It’s getting crowded
at the top
Gulftsream’s G650 announcement introduces yet another airframe at the
top end of the business aviation market. The range is an impressive
7,000 NM at .85 Mach and 5,000-NM at 0.9 Mach. This all looks very
good but speed costs money, and the DOC/hour of the G650 is
likely to be around the $3,500 mark (perhaps more).
Competition with the Global Express will be interesting, but might come
down to a matter of personal requirements, not necessarily comparative
aircraft performances. One of the most notable pieces of news coming out
of this announcement has to do with the selection of Thales for the
design of the Fly By Wire system, perhaps Bombardier will read the
signs here. Now Gulfstream can also work on their website loading
speed too…
Of Politicians, Tricycles and Professionals…
As the tanker saga continues we are tempted to drop the topic
from this blog altogether. However, comments we hear in the “news” media
and from Capitol Hill might give Jay Leno and Jimmy Kimmel some
interesting competition. In all seriousness, the storm is
gathering strength and the aftermath of the competition is seemingly
losing all elements of logical thinking. It is regrettable that the
Boeing protest is driven mostly by complaints related to technicalities
in the USAF selection processes. It looks increasingly like this is
being managed by a group of lawyers advising BA that the only way
to overturn the NGC win is to show how USAF made mistakes in changing
requirements during the competition. We are in no position to
judge if Boeing’s strategy has legal merit (we think it regrettably
might).
What is conspicuously absent from the whole debate, and especially from
the media comes down to this simple question: What is the
best aircraft for the warfighter to execute this strategic, long-term
mission (and give US forces an advantage when our Beijing friends get
their own tricycles over to Taiwan)? We have not heard a
single lawmaker ask the best for the warfighter question during
subcommittee hearings; Sue Payton was only there to face the so
predictable ire of congressmen “angry” from WA and KS (thou shalt rename
temporarily nameless here).
The way Ms. Payton handled some of our elected representatives’
questions (correction: posturing) deserves the Nobel Peace Prize or its
US equivalent since the previously nameless would probably complain that
the Nobel Prize is a threat to national security due to its high foreign
content and should be presented in the 6th district of the great State
of Washington.
Our sarcasm is noticeable because the protest’s banner holders have
contributed to Boeing’s (reasonable) questions causing the argument to
lose any logical sense and defensibility. Weak arguments, short-term
political needs and emotional temper tantrums are a common thread.
Boeing’s case, and we believe that some of the points raised by Mark
McGraw have merits, now needs to be handled by professionals that can
re-ignite a rational and defendable case for the 767. Who
better but USAF to do this? They (and Boeing) need to tell the
non-Boeing crowd to tone down, as the rhetoric will get them nowhere.
Similarly, Northrop Grumman needs to keep a lid on dubious claims
suddenly doubling the number of incidental jobs created by KC-45A; the
tit–for-tat is frankly getting a little old. The best
of the media reporting about the KC-45 aftermath can be found
here,
here and here.
Those are the professionals that deserve some attention.
What we find interesting is that Boeing is seriously pointing to the
many risks with the production model (multiple sites, multiple partners)
that NGC is planning for KC-45A. When one looks at the many
problems encountered by an even more decentralized program like 787, one
may wonder why Boeing chooses this line of criticism. It is
regrettable that criticism toward KC-30 often omits the name
Northrop Grumman from (surprisingly) inferior selective reporting
such as CNN’s Lou
Dobbs. Northrop Grumman is one heck of a great American
organization and how they managed to trump the equally great American
Boeing Company speaks volumes about the strength of their tanker
strategy. Case closed.
ISTAT and the unanswered questions
John Leahy is a brave man. He has, for better or worse,
become the official voice of Airbus for many years and thus has earned,
deservedly at times ("The 7E7 is not a threat"), but not most
of the time, his fair share of criticism. Most recently, he has
been right on the money when he indicated that about 27% of recent
commercial orders are “on shaky grounds”. We said 25% last summer,
but again, that was before the credit bubble of August. However,
it is reasonable to question his recent point as reported by
Flight here “People are "smoking something" if they say we
really need to come up with a new narrowbody sooner than now being
projected”. Is there any truth behind his statements or does
this need to be filed into the Leahyism section?
2017 is a long time; airlines such as Air France and a few others would
have ideally liked a new generation narrowbody aircraft by 2012.
Airbus suggestions that they might have to wait until 2017 earliest is
indicative of two things: either Airbus is ready to introduce a
320NG that can serve as a bridge to the new narrowbody or Toulouse is
now engaged in not so subtle disinformation warfare.
As far as engine technology is concerned, GTF is likely to remain the
best choice; we believe that propfans have too many risks (speed,
certification…) and unknowns associated with airline operations that
basically outweigh the benefits. We feel Boeing will launch its
replacement narrowbody aircraft first as the 737NG will not be easily
upgradeable, unlike the A320, and thus has entered its downward product
cycle. 737 will have to go by 2014. Competition will
intensify for Toulouse and Everett and it will come from Montreal and
may be from San Jose (and partner(s)?) if rumors are indeed correct.
A Desjardins Securities analyst recently hinted at a 150 pax C-Series,
and we believe this is a likely development for the yet to be officially
launched new Bombardier aircraft. The C-Series has a serious
window of opportunity that may extend from 2014 to 2017 if Airbus and
Boeing decide to postpone their new narrowbody introduction to market.
What is the opportunity for a 130-155 pax C-Series? If
Bombardier hits its market window it will be in direct competition for
an addressable market estimated at 3,500+ aircraft…
Now if you wonder why we keep mentioning tricycles, see the first
cartoon below.
Friday 4 PM humor (follow hyperlinks below by clicking on
image)
The dust has settled; is
this the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end?
Familiar words indeed, yet we cannot be but surprised at the immensely
logical decision our Department of Defense announced yesterday Feb. 29.
The Northrop Grumman team win is a slap in the face to conformism, petty
protectionism, pork and short-term business considerations. With the
benefits of hindsight, most of the signs were already there.
In 2004,
I spoke at a conference in Los Angeles, and made the so predictable call
that Boeing would win the tanker program and anybody even thinkingEADS had a shot was out of his/her mind. I even offered to pay
for dinner at one of the most expensive Georgetown restaurants if it did
happen. A couple of years later, my offer was off the table and so
was my thinking that Boeing could engage cruise control and win KC-X.
The EADS team, and its new partner Northrop Grumman, had just put one
very strong offer on the table and my conversation(s) with the crew at
the Alabama economic development office impressed me in terms of the
KC-30 team’s vision and motivation. To the end I would have
favored a split award; it appeared to be the most logical decision from
the end user standpoint, although it probably would have been
cost-prohibitive to develop two types concurrently.
We have expressed our
view in this blog that a KC-X win for EADS-Northrop, whether a split or
sole source, would have tremendous consequences for the US based
aerospace industry. For the first time in decades, our country
would witness an expansion of its large airframe production facility
footprint as a result of the KC-30 team win. The opportunities created
by this win are many and could eventually have positive consequences for
Boeing and its customers. A shake up at Boeing is likely, now the game
is afoot, and Northrop Grumman plans as an EADS gateway into the US
market will grow. With A330F coming to Mobile, we expect the partnership
to work on future programs, including the new A320RS and perhaps
pitching the A400M to the US military sometime in the middle of the next
decade. Boeing now needs to reexamine its internal decision making
processes and understand that old strategies no longer works in this
global market driven by the ever-changing concept of “best value”.
Boeing’s loss is
regrettable, because of its impact on the Everett, BFI and Wichita
workforces in particular (although the job losses figures used by
opponents to the NGC-EADS team are grossly exaggerated). KC-767, although not as capable in many
areas as KC-30, is still a product that could have served USAF very
well. Information will slowly emerge, but we believe that
classified scenario modeling showed USAF that KC-30 was better suited
for future engagements and added much-needed airlift strategic
capabilities. That alone was probably the deciding factor in the
selection of the KC-30. The information and measurement criteria
were reserved to USAF and the bidding teams and thus will remain
classified for years. Economic considerations, price and other
elements were important but did not appear to have been the primary
deciding factors.
Was
price a deciding factor? Of course, but Boeing should have been
able to easily match any EADS offer in that regard. If not the case,
then this was a serious mistake. Steve Trimble gives us a
pretty good idea of price and its impact in the DEW line.
KC-30 is a like the Big
One in California. It is not a matter of if the quake will happen
but when. Well, it happened on February 29, and it signals a departure
in DoD thinking where best value has triumphed over pork and the
business-as-usual mentality. The strategic implication for the
occidental aerospace industry is also clear. Note my use of the
word occidental. I, for one, believe strongly that a rapprochement
between the European and US aerospace industries is not only desirable
but also required to counter emerging Asian capabilities and support
both continents defense budgets. To rethink our agreements and
bury our differences will be necessary if our common industries are to
remain competitive through 2020 and beyond. Failure to partner and
engage in joint programs will only leave our industries vulnerable,
reduce innovation capabilities, affect NATO’s ability to operate and
adversely impact our ability to remain globally competitive. Let
me be very clear, the Airbus vs. Boeing battle is nothing compared with
what our aerospace industries will face from China and others in the
future.
For the Boeing worker on
the floor in Everett, this prose may be interpreted with pessimism and
categorized as a complete misunderstanding of the realities faced by
American workers today. The sentiment of abandonment and betrayal
are probably very real and completely understandable. However, for
future generations of Aerospace workers in America and Europe, this deal
signals that our government customers are now prepared to address and
intervene directly to put an end to our industrial base rate of
departure.
Boeing
cannot reasonably argue that KC-767 was the all American solution (75%+
US content).
KC-30 perhaps has a lower US content (60%+) but the loss is bitter because it
comes so close after years of tension with France and Germany in
particular. Regardless, American companies are going to benefit
tremendously from this deal, from engines to avionics to maintenance, so
the argument that America lost and France won is “null and void”.
Perhaps Boeing failed to
take risks. This is where Northrop Grumman CEO Ron Sugar needs to
be commended for taking the initiative to go after this deal with a
solution many ridiculed at the time. Going with a mostly
Franco-German product for DoD on the back end of one of the most serious
diplomatic crisis in US-EU relations was a risky gamble that paid off.
Did Boeing also fail to
measure the impact of the KC-30 in the mind of the customer? I
think USAF came to KC-30 with little or no knowledge of the aircraft and
its capabilities, and as the competition progressed it became clear that
KC-30 better suited the mission. This also was our perception at
G2 Solutions. The more we looked into the value propositions of
both teams, the more value we began to see emerging from the KC-30
product.
Now what can Boeing do? Should they protest or
will they be forced into protesting by the usual, yet logical, political
pressure of a few? If Boeing is to protest, they must not do so
because they know they might be able to reverse DoD’s decision with
support from the Hill. Boeing should now think hard about whether
or not it can change DoD’s mind based on the KC-767’s merits. In
our opinion, KC-30 has won once, and would win again in a recompete
scenario. Boeing was reluctant to throw 777 into the KC-X fight
and this might have been why they lost. The footprint and other
“best fit” arguments have been tossed back at Boeing with the KC-X
decision and USAF’s underlying message to Everett has been that
institutional inertia and risk aversion lead to failure. Boeing’s
decision to continue selling a 767 airframe solution perhaps better
suited to U.S. allies than its own DoD is in short a colossal failure of
vision. Such shortsightedness is not limited to Boeing, but to all,
including we who had predicted Boeing would win outright or at least
garner (in G2’s case), a portion of KC-X.
Loosing KC-X is a bitter pill to swallow for Boeing and for Washington
State; despite the monumental denial of cash, its impact on Boeing's
Everett operation should be minimal in the short term. This is
certainly not the gloom and doom that many in the industry or in the sensationalist politico-media complex have
incorrectly described. Boeing, as an aerospace organization, is doing
very well for the foreseeable future and with 787 issues being resolved
rigorously, the KC-X loss will motivate and help the company refocus and develop
stronger competitive offerings in the future.
We were just informed that our KC-767 Advanced Tanker proposal was not
selected in the KC-135 Replacement Program known as KC-X.
Obviously we are very disappointed with this outcome. We believe that
we offered the Air Force the best value and lowest risk tanker for its
mission. Our next step is to request and receive a debrief from the Air
Force. Once we have reviewed the details behind the award, we will make
a decision concerning our possible options, keeping in mind at all times
the impact to the warfighter and our nation.
The Boeing Company would like to thank the many people who helped us
in this campaign. We have received tremendous support from our
suppliers, elected federal/state/local leaders, unions, community
groups, and the 160,738 men and women who work for Boeing.
Northrop Statement:
February 29, 2008—Northrop Grumman announced today that it has been
selected by the U.S. Air Force to provide the KC-45A aerial refueling
tanker for the KC-135 tanker replacement program. The Air Force’s KC-45A
is based on the highly-successful A330 commercial airframe, produced by
EADS.
DoD Announcement Boeing remains favorite to win KC-X, but
split award would signal new strategic DoD vision for US based aerospace
industry
Credit: Boeing/EADS Week Ending 2-22-2008
B-2 lost on take off at Andersen AFB, Guam
Pacific News Center
US AIR FORCE PHOTO
The 12th B-2 "Spirit of Kansas"
was lost on take off from Andersen early Saturday morning. Both
pilots ejected shortly after the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft
had entered service in February 1995 with the 509th Bomber Wing based in
Whiteman AFB, MO.
Two aircraft concepts that make sense.
Business Aviation:
Temporary Surge
Quick Thoughts:
- Cessna remains the undisputed market leader
- Bombardier's growth rate is well below par, reflecting aging of its
product line
- Gulfstream, Embraer and Dassault expanded output between 15 to 33
percent
Bear Sighting in the Pacific
Photos: US Navy CVN-68 visited by Bear Couple
Tanker Award: Only a matter of Politics?
The date draws near; we should know, hopefully this month, who between
Northrop Grumman and Boeing will win the lucrative contract to provide
the US military with a much-needed nextgen tanker aircraft. This has
been a long road, particularly for the customer, and let us hope the
award to either team marks the beginning of a change of tone within the
defense contractor community, and will not lead to a protest. For some
reasons, we doubt it.
Recently G2 Solutions was contacted by Bloomberg to discuss the tanker
award and take part in their analyst survey. The article can be found
here. Although not statistically relevant, this survey highlights
some clearly consensual facts about this competition:
- It is Boeing's to lose
- A protest is likely
- The tanker award will mark the beginning of "a real political struggle"
Our position has been clear from the beginning; although we see
significant merits to awarding part of this contract to the
EADS-Northrop team, it remains clear to us that Boeing is the Air Force
favorite and a large cross-party majority of Congress. Northrop Grumman
and EADS' strategies have been very shrewd, and the last minute (and
predictable) announcement by Tom Enders last month could still resonate
positively with those who will ultimately sign the checks.
And why not? The EADS offer is full of merits, from job creation, to
addition of production capabilities within the US, to expanding
partnerships between the European and US aerospace industries and
ultimately, delivering a strong product to the customer.
Boeing has been in the driver’s seat for most of the competition so far,
and has been clearly steering the program towards KC-767 although it
hinted that 777 was on the card at one point. However, we have been
sensing some anxiety with Boeing’s recent moves (Northrop-EADS have also
made a lot of noise about KC-30’s “best-value”), but this recent
declaration in the media from Boeing's tanker spokesman is odd (as
reported by Scott Hamilton on his website www.leeham.net) and
claims
that Boeing would be out of the tanker business for the next 20-40 years
if Northrop-EADS wins KC-X. While remotely possible, this statement is
a bit over the top in our opinion. Boeing has indeed shown some signs
of nervousness about KC-X in 2008. First, it was an unconvincing and
largely irrelevant fuel consumption survey posted on Boeing's tanker
website on January 14th, then the gloom and doom comment from their
spokesman, what’s next?
Yes, we like the 767; it’s an altogether great aircraft, and is the
logical choice for the USAF. However, the KC-30 is quite the KC-767 on
steroids and can deliver where 767 might come short. The strong
reliance of the USAF on KC-10s for operations in the Middle East helps
illustrate the significant role played by such large tanker assets.
Although we do not think the Air Force ought to buy 179 of them, a fleet
of 50-70 KC-30 would significantly help USAF operate globally quite
efficiently. Both projects also carry a fairly close level of risks;
both are hybrids and relatively untested concepts.
The battle for cash is really at the heart of the matter. With ever
increasing R&D costs, Boeing has been spending considerable sums to keep
NGC/EADS away from its turf and prevent a win that might positively
impact Airbus’ ability to finance its nextgen A350 and A320 replacement
narrowbody aircraft as well as its A400M military transport aircraft.
The same goes for EADS by the way, Boeing has been spending large
amounts of cash defending Fort-Tanker and a loss would mean less cash
available for R&D and other programs such as KC-Y. This is one of the
last DoD mega contracts to be awarded for a while, and one which will
shape our aerospace landscape and its ability to commercially compete
with Asia in the future.
Then come politics and the ugliness of it all; the current
administration has awarded several major and highly visible contracts to
European based manufacturers: the presidential helicopter to Agusta
Westland (together with LMT) and the C-27J to Alenia (together with LMT
and L-3), and the UH-72 award to American Eurocopter. Those contracts
were primarily awarded to countries that initially supported the
administration's policy in Iraq, and especially not to States leaning on
the other side of the political fence. There are those who predict a
fight on the Hill against "rewarding" a Franco-German company. While
still a possible outcome, this does not resonate as strongly as it
could have four or five years ago. What ultimately will win votes are
jobs. With a US economy now clearly entering a recession, a split award
might be exactly what both sides of the aisle need to show they are
doing something about helping the economy recover. Losing fifty tankers
to NGC-EADS will barely affect Boeing's commercial aircraft record
production over the next five years but will have an overall positive
impact on US exports once 330F enters production.
There might be more to this, although not discussed at length in the US
media, transatlantic relations are possibly on the verge of another
downturn following years of moderate improvements. The NATO crisis over
Afghanistan is soon to enter a new phase and a very public resumption of
transatlantic disagreements over military operations could provide some
added traction and arguments for those pushing for the “perceived” all
American solution. Regardless the outcome, EADS-Northrop Grumman has
already won a significant battle. The partnership has demonstrated it can
provide a competitive solution to the government, that it can become a
near US-based partner and that transatlantic cooperation is viable and
desirable in the long run.
FY09 Budget Figures Available from
DoD
This remarkable 360
Panorama is available
here or
by clicking on the picture below.
Lockheed Martin in trouble with
Morocco?
It would appear that the F-16 sale to
Morocco is far from certain. After literally being handed the deal
by the dysfunctional Dassault-French Government team, Lockheed Martin is
now reportedly experiencing difficulties with the 24
F-16s financing. Paris' Les Echos has reported that the $2.4 billion
financing required by Morocco is not coming together as planned.
The subprime crisis was a factor back in the summer of 2007, and it would
appear that it has become an even bigger issue now from a banking
standpoint. This does not
mean that the F-16 is out (yet). It however could signify some serious
problems ahead which may lead Morocco to reconsider the offer, and either
revert to its original choice with Rafale (France was able to put
financing for 18 aircraft, but too late) or postpone this purchase
altogether. With the Algerian AF modernizing and the Libyans also
looking at Rafale and Sukhoi, Morocco's Mirage F-1s and Northrop F-5s would
suffer greatly in any BVR engagements against the Algerian SU-30s.
Morocco badly needs to upgrade and taking a smaller number of Rafales or
F-16s might be next on the agenda.
Mr. Enders Goes to Mobile or is Airbus
heading for Alabama?
EADS has scheduled an early press conference
for Monday morning 9am Eastern time. Tom Enders will be there
accompanied with some heavy hitters including Ralph Crosby, Governor Jim
Riley (R) and Senator Jeff Sessions (R). Based on Dr Enders previous
comments late last year, it is reasonable to assume that EADS might
announce that they have opted to move forward with the production of the
A-330F in Mobile which would provide EADS with a production/assembly
operation inside the dollar zone. KC-45 is also on the table and no
doubt that any decision by EADS to move forward with the 330F might have
some influence on the soon to come USAF decision
The Year of Living
Dangerously
Not exactly what most of us would like to hear as 2008 begins its
takeoff roll. 2007 was a milestone year for commercial aviation, it
likely will not be followed by a repeat in 2008. With the US economy now
feeling the pain of the credit crisis, high energy costs and a weakened
dollar the domino effect we had feared would ensue is beginning to show
signs of strength in other areas.
With the European and some Asian economies also exposed to a US
downturn, 2008 likely will be a year of economic correction; this is our
best case scenario. Both Boeing and Airbus had incredible years, orders
have surged to never seen levels with more than 1400 aircraft orders for
Boeing alone, Airbus has yet to release its final number but it looks
like it very well might exceed Boeing’s. Can this be repeated in 2008?
Doubtful, this is possibly as good as it might be for at least five
years, the market will enter a period of relative contraction for now.
Business aviation also had a milestone year, VLJs are now in full-rate
production and services. However, serious questions remain as to the
short term survival of some programs including the often troubled
Eclipse 500A. The recent termination of the ATG Javelin program did not
come as a surprise to G2 Solutions, as the aircraft served the interest
of too narrow a market segment and had serious teething problems.
Without question VLJ numbers will continue to grow, however we would
expect one or two additional programs not to make it past 2008.
Consolidation in the US airlines industry will likely materialize as
well. A rapprochement Delta/United or Delta/Northwest has long been
rumored. It is also possible that one or two airlines might go belly up
due to a likely contraction of passenger traffic in North America. Air
France’s turnaround initiated in the late 1990s is about to mirror
French President Sarkozy’s new Italian romance. The Alitalia takeover
will undoubtedly be a boost for the AF/KLM group’s main hubs in Paris
and Amsterdam which will benefit from the increased intra-European
traffic towards Malpensa, Linate and Venice. Some Italian resistance is
to be expected, in particular with regard to international service to
MPX. Business travelers in particular will logically be annoyed at
being forced to add a stop to their travel.
On the military side we might see the end or a new beginning of the
tanker saga. Hopefully the Air Force will decide in favor of both
manufacturers as both aircraft can serve the US military well. The USAF
crisis will likely intensify, with aging F-15s being grounded due to
structural fatigue. G2 Solutions understands that Canadian C/F-18s have
been flying CAP missions usually flown by USAF F-15s out of Elmendorf
AFB. As unfortunate as F-15 structural fatigue problems are for the
current force, it might be fortuitous for the F-35 and F-22 programs.
Suffice to say that pork will have a taste of F-22 and F-35 in 2008,
might as well pile on as much as possible in this final stretch for the
Lone Star State. Navy also faces some tough questions ahead with
several programs likely to face either delays or cuts, P-8 and BAMS come
to mind. Delays or cancellations in either of these programs will
increase the scrutiny on P-3 availability rates. The Navy is doing
everything in its power to keep these aircraft flying, but the size and
scope of P-3 airframe corrosion seems only to worsen over time.
Despite claims to the contrary, this will have a negative effect on P-3
deployability and capability.
On the international scene, this will be the make-or-break year for
Rafale. If the Libyan order materializes as expected this could be a
major boost for the aircraft in markets such as India, Korea, Japan and
especially Switzerland. Combined with a reshuffling at SOFREMA, France
might get it right. The aircraft still needs critical planned
improvements in the areas of radar and engines to be exported
successfully. The big question in 08 will also be the future of
international F-35. With 2007’s technical delays, some might reevaluate
the program with a more critical eye, especially the UK, Netherlands and
Denmark. There are still signs of discord about technology transfers
with the US. The challenge of configuring a baseline aircraft to STOVL,
conventional and carrier operations should not be underestimated as F-35
development grinds on. DoD and international service-specific airframe
numbers will continue to flux throughout 2008; it’s best to write those
order numbers in pencil. G2 Solutions would be very surprised if those
international partners back out of the F-35 program at this point, as
offsets and partner industrial base considerations quickly move into the
political and economic realms.
Will Bombardier (ever) launch the C-Series? Please see us later about
this one.
2007 also witnessed China's remarkable entry in the (major) commercial
aircraft market with the roll out of its 717, sorry, ARJ. More will
follow and it is possible that we will see a 170-220 passenger aircraft
manufactured in the PRC by the end of next decade. China can build
aircraft, perhaps with the support of foreign companies initially as it
was the case for the J-10 and J-11 combat aircraft, but the country will
transition to more indigenous designs next decade leading it to become a
force to reckon with by 2025.
Embraer will continue to be one of the companies to get it right in
2008; we have yet to see the San Jose side miscalculate. Its E-Jets
series has been very successful and the Phenom programs appear to be
well on track. With the 320/737 replacement programs entering a
critical year, it is possible that we will witness Embraer being courted
by either Airbus or Boeing to support this gargantuan program.
2008 will also shake things up politically, elections in the US and
transition of government in Russia will all have strong impacts on
aerospace markets. The US appears to be leaning away from the War on
Terror as a political center of gravity, which might have a significant
impact on the DoD crowd residing in the city surrounded by reality.
2008 will also be a dangerous year and it will happen in the Middle
East. Iran still fails to reassure with regards to its nuclear
intentions. The US National Intelligence Estimate has been felt like a
shockwave and Israel is feeling increasingly vulnerable. Syria and
Hezbollah might be looking for ways to retaliate and Iraq, while slowly
improving, might get thrown into turmoil if Turkey decides to act
decisively against Kurdish separatists. A regional satellite, Pakistan,
might also completely collapse into civil war this year, which would
certainly have strong consequences for its Indian neighbor. Global
warming and those carbon offsets look really like non issues when one
examines the potential global ramifications of crisis in that region.
We will expand more, January 31st to be precise for the annual forecast
webinar, see us on the
Aviation Today website.
The Future of US DoD?
Thomas P.M. Barnettoutlines
a post-Cold War solution for DoD
December 2007
Warning: one ship might
hide another
Outside
Photo: French Navy
Seems like our Russian friends have found ways
to discreetly ship surplus Tarentul Missile boats courtesy of the
Norwegian sealift vessel M/V Eide. Destination: Vietnam. The value
of airborne maritime patrol assets clearly illustrated by this find from
a French Navy Dauphin Helicopter. The M/V Eide had previously been used
to ship the Canadian Submarine HMCS Chicoutimi back to Halifax NS in
2004 following a fire during its first cruise shortly after departing
Faslane Naval Base in Scotland.
Inside Photo: French Navy
Here is a Tarentul freely roaming the seas.
Rafale Accident: Initial Inquiry Suggests
Spatial Disorientation Could be the Primary Factor
Photo Sirpa air
French investigators have been
examining the data recovered from the Sq 1/7 Rafale B's recorders that
crashed in Southwestern France last week, and information now suggests
that pilot spatial disorientation is being singled out as the likely
cause of the crash. Two Rafales were practicing combat maneuvers
Thursday December 6th, when one aircraft abruptly dived into
the ground from 12,000ft following a head to head engagement.
The FAF investigators' initial interpretation suggests that the pilot of
the Rafale might have been under the impression he was maneuvering in
the horizontal plane when in fact data shows the aircraft was
maneuvering in the vertical plane. It also appears that the pilot
had full control of his aircraft and was executing maneuvers with the
aircraft until impact, this would support the now likely spatial
disorientation theory.
The accident tool place at night and in bad weather conditions.
The French Air Force investigation team has not uncovered so far any
mechanical problems with the aircraft. However, temporary G-LOC or
other physiological events have not been excluded yet.
Airbus A340 Overrun in Toronto
Runway Overrun and Fire, Air France
Flight 358, Airbus A340-313 F-GLZQ, Toronto/Lester B. Pearson
International Airport, Ontario, 02 August 2005
Video animation now available from
Transport Safety Board of Canada (click on picture below to stream)
Despite the loss of a Rafale B
during a routine mission on Thursday, Dassault could announce the first
export sale of the Rafale during the state visit of Col. Muammar Al
Gaddafi in Paris.
However, it now appears that as President Sarkozy and Col Gaddafi are
meeting for the third time in Paris this week, the French government is
in turmoil over comments made by the Libyan head of state over human
rights at UNESCO Tuesday evening.
The order could be for a full squadron of aircraft with an estimated
value at around $1 billion. Presidential sources have in Paris have
indicated late Monday evening that Libya was interested in a total of 14
Rafales as well as Tiger helicopters and upgrades for Mirage F1s (see
our blog entry in August for more info)
No further information has emerged about Thursday's accident which
involved a Rafale B aircraft from Squadron 1/7 Provence, based out of St
Dizier Air Base in Northeastern France. Based on available information,
the pilot did not attempt to eject nor did he establish radio contact
with his wingman as the aircraft plummeted to the ground from 12,000ft.
Update:
It looks like things will take more time for Rafale's first export.
It appears that Libya is indeed committed to buying the aircraft but
this contract still needs to be negotiated. Verdict before July
2008 according to sources.
Burt Rutan: The Future of Space Exploration
at the TED conference, Monterey 2006
GAO:
Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety: Sustained Efforts to Address
Leadership, Technology, and Other Challenges Needed to Reduce Accidents
and Incidents
Full GAO report available
here Solutions to address the problem of
runway incursion are already available. Honeywell has been leading the
effort with its RAAS (Runway Awareness and Advisory System) already in
service with Air France and soon Emirates. For more details about
RAAS, click on the image below.
November 2007
KC-X: Split buy chances are increasing
There is a lot ofmedia
information circulating about the tanker program and the newly announced
delay now scheduled for sometime in the first quarter of 08. We have made no
secrets at G2 Solutions that the Boeing KC- 767 was our favorite based on
multiple elements.
Overall, it indeed appears the aircraft is a better fit in the Air Force
inventory. Oh well, if defense market intelligence were logical,
politicians would be too, an entirely impossible scenario and one likely to
never materialize given the possibility of a split buy.Why are we suddenly thinking split buy? The Air
Force has indicated they cannot afford both airframes; perhaps USAF should
rephrase it and declare, "We can afford it but instead really want to assign
those funds towards more F-22As" or something like that. Another
argument, wisely used by both the customer and Boeing is that a split buy
would increase the overall cost to the AF, not only from an acquisition
standpoint but also from a cost of operation issue. The main argument
in this case being that microfleets are expensive,
and unless one goes for a large number of aircraft the cost penalty will
remain, a strong argument against a split buy for sure. However, any
commercial operator could show USAF, and we remember one distinct EU based
cargo company that shall remain nameless, who demonstrated that above a
certain number of aircraft, somewhere around 35, the cost penalty of a split
buy is marginal at best.
Read the signs: what
is the best way for the Air Force to avoid a costly, time consuming,
emotionally charged and at the end of the day entirely wasteful protest?
Split buy.In an ideal world, maybe; however,
what is really at stake here? The tanker award is key, no questions,
but let's look at the big picture. Boeing is fighting this battle for
one main (good) reason, to get Airbus off its turf and to prevent the
emergence of a potential new player in the commercial aircraft market:
Northrop Grumman.
Are we exaggerating here? Maybe, but
let's look at the facts. IF NGC-EADS wins tanker or even a small
portion of it, then Mobile is a go. KC-30s will be assembled there and
it is likely that the 330Fs will soon follow. This
location thus becomes sustainable for a minimum of ten years, more with
orders from the US based package carriers. This would give ample time to
Airbus to design a utilization strategy for the facility based around either
cargo markets or its new narrowbody aircraft scheduled for production
between 2015-2020. Airbus is a company already built around
decentralized production sites;
adding one based on the US dollar is exactly what Tom Enders
needs to ensure the organization emerges from the strong Euro/oil/credit/380 crisis.
If Airbus adopts a 787 model for the future 3XX narrowbody production, then
Mobile becomes a possible production hub for the aircraft, together with
Hamburg. Sarkozy is breaking the gallic unions' back right now, give
him a few more years and he might well succeed at marginalizing the French
national pastime, the almighty national strike. Union protests about the new
US site could thus become a non-issue in the future.Boeing is
fighting for its role (and perceived identity) as the sole US-based
commercial air transport manufacturer. IF US KC-30 happens, Airbus
then becomes part of the US aerospace industrial base equation; the
KC-X US only supply chain becomes much less of an issue (bordering
irrelevance) and Northrop Grumman (together with its powerful lobby and
talent) becomes a force in the commercial aircraft business by the middle of
next decade. With US defense markets looking to take a dive from
FY09-10, the company needs to maintain growth momentum and diversify into
commercial ventures. The joint marketing and possibly design of future
Airbus aircraft is looking increasingly like a distant possibility. Did we
say merger? We cannot go that far yet. KC-X split award is not
entirely about a small 30-40 KC-30 order; Boeing is really fighting about
maintaining its relative control over the US military customer and keeping
Airbus away from US soil. If Airbus sets up shop in AL (courtesy of US
taxpayer money via USAF), then the impact at the WTO will surely be felt, as
will the ability of Airbus to maintain its R&D and product momentum.
Boeing's future beyond KC-X hangs in the balance and our neighbors
definitely do not want to witness the emergence of a US based euro-US hybrid
(as BBC Top Gear’s Jeremy Clarkson would say, “Beware of the hybrid that is
supposed to save money and the earth but in fact is nothing but an
overweight, overpriced and under performing vehicle).
Now about KC-30 vs. KC767. We have put together a table based on an
internal exercise we conducted a few weeks ago. This was strictly a
qualitative, thus opinionated assessment of the perceived & relative
strengths and weaknesses of both airframes and teams,
nothing scientific there. Based
on what we read in the press and hear from our sources, we came to this oh
so surprising conclusion: it is too close to call. As a matter of fact, let's call it a tie.
Still, as you can see from the figure below, we still favor KC-767.
However, no doubt that KC-30 has a role to play in the USAF inventory.
Now let's relocate our operation to Geneva, we sound more and more like
neutral Switzerland these days.
V-22’s deploy to theater, and finally a chance to
prove a touted transformational USMC force-projection capability
I had a conversation with a friend the other day, who
happens to have been an active duty Marine. We have a number of
conversations – some enlightened, some not so. He has a love for all
things rotary wing, so naturally over time our talks turned to the Osprey
and the roughly 25-year path this aircraft has taken to Iraq. I received
word shortly thereafter from another source that the V-22 was in theater,
replete with this picture of the Thunder Chickens of USMC Tiltrotor Squadron
263.
I sent this image, and here was the snippet of our
conversation that followed:
RS: “Did you get that email and picture I sent you about
the first Marine V-22 unit to arrive in theater?
USMC Friend: “Haven’t seen it yet, but was it a picture
of the V-22, with the Marines in the windows screaming ‘Save us!”
His comment was flippant but concise. From reading
the USMC/rotary wing blogosphere one can see comments of serious concern
about the Osprey. From an outsider’s perspective, the Osprey is a bit
of an acquisition contradiction for the Marine Corps, a service that has
traditionally eschewed long lead times, budget busting programs (through FY
2006 more than $20 billion spent DoD wide) and exotic, minimally-proven
concepts. At times the Osprey was said to encompass up to 70 percent of the
entire Marine Corps acquisition budget.
The blogosphere comments seem to hinge on a perceived
lack of defensive armament, autorotate inability and doubt regarding the
Osprey’s ability to take battle damage and continue its mission. The Ospreys
currently deployed will rely on a single flex-mounted 7.62 mm machine gun,
manually operated only when the rear door is open. The Marines plan to
acquire some 360 Ospreys, while the Navy and Air Force currently plan to buy
100 more combined.
The Osprey aims to bring with it ability to self deploy,
and the following performance information from the Osprey Web are indeed
impressive:
Performance
Max Cruise speed (MCP), SL, kts (km/h) : 241-257
(446-476) Max R/C, A/P Mode, SL, fpm (m/m) : 3,200 (975) Service ceiling,
ISA, ft (m) : 24,700 (7,529) OEI Service ceiling, ISA, ft (m) : 10,300
(3,139) HOGE ceiling, ISA, ft (m) : 5,400 (1,646)
We also have word that BAE Systems is attempting to fast
track a retractable, automated GAU-17 7.62 mm belly gun for the V-22.
The gun is intended to provide 360-degree suppressive fire. The system
is dubbed the Remote Guardian(TM) System (RGS), and BAE is attempting to
have it available for installation in Q3, 2008. Adding the RGS system
to the V-22 after deployment flight testing and systems development invites
issues not limited to: weight, center of gravity, flight characteristics,
range, speed, payload and when and how (in the flight envelope) the gun can
be deployed. Currently the RGS is designed to provide fire throughout the
V-22 flight envelope. The demands from the V-22 user community must have
been intense in order to bring the RGS to the fore this late in the game.
The elimination of the autorotation requirement is in
concept offset by the Osprey’s ability to use altitude and lift
characteristics to glide to a belly landing, although it is tacitly
acknowledged this maneuver is dicey at best at altitudes below 1,700 feet.
The Osprey became an object of focus in the course of G2
research into Department of Defense spending on the Maintenance, Repair and
Overhaul of Aircraft Structural. The Osprey caught our attention for
all the same reasons we’ve now seen in a Time Magazine cover story, although
the timing and tenor of the Time article seems at best coincidental and at
worst opportunistic. I am no apologist for the V-22, but this story could
have run anytime in the past four or five years replete with the same cogent
points on budget, capabilities, accidents that have claimed the lives of 30
people and a flight testing regimen that has come under criticism for being
truncated and/or falsified.
The degree to which the V-22 delivers on its promises
will soon become apparent, but we at G2 Solutions believe the V-22 will have
continuing teething problems, equal to or greater than any new weapons
system deployed to a hostile theater of operations. In this respect G2
Solutions is led to believe that the DoD’s current fleet of CH-47, CH-46,
CH-53 derivatives and other rotary-wing transport/assault assets will
continue in use and importance, in spite of plans to replace portions of
operational responsibilities with the V-22. If G2 Solutions is
correct, the DoD will have to continue its impressive on-the-fly regimen of
in-theater or stateside repair, maintenance and recapitalization of these
vital assets beyond current timelines.
The Osprey would seem now to have a chance to prove its
detractors wrong, to prove that this aircraft can be truly transformational,
enabling a force projection and protection capability not currently offered
by the workhorse CH-46 Sea Knight and CH-53 variants in the Navy/Marine
Corps.
Japan is making very good progress with three critical
programs, C-X, P-X and FS-X. The latter driven in particular by its aging
F-4 and F-15 fleets and current export restrictions with the F-22A. FS-X,
now ATD-X has been on the table for about eight years and it emerges now
that some serious work has been ongoing to possibly field the aircraft by
the second half of next decade, especially if the US does not release F-22A
to Japan. Whether or not the ATD-X will move beyond the technology
demonstrator phase remains primarily a matter of politics. Japan is
increasingly likely to grow its indigenous defense industry and rely less on
US systems in the future.
The rise of China also poses a critical problem from a
political standpoint in particular, with the Japanese military wanting to
increase domestic sourcing, or at least diversify them to avoid too much
reliance on US suppliers. With China gaining political influence in the US,
the long standing ties between the Japanese military and the US defense
industry might begin to show some cracks soon. However, building a domestic
5th generation fighter aircraft will be a challenging task for Japan, but
definitely not an insurmountable one; especially with the (expensive)
experience gained with F-2. In the meantime, the JASDF needs to procure
interim fighters to replace the F-4EJ KAI early next decade. The
competition between the F-18E/F, Eurofighter, Rafale and F-35 will be
interesting and perhaps could go to Eurofighter judging by the strong
interest expressed by the JASDF for the aircraft. Here is a look at the
ATD-X courtesy of Fuji News Network, nice aircraft.
France vs. France or when Rafale loses again
Fighter Export Success Depends on Aircraft
and Sales TeamPerformance
Chinese Grand Prix 2007: Britain's sensational rookie
Lewis Hamilton is about fifty laps away from becoming the first driver to
win the formula one championship in his first year. Two hours later, a
combined team and driver mistake has seen his championship lead shrink by
seven and four points over his two rivals. Two weeks later in Brazil,
Ferrari's Kimi Raikkonen capitalizes and wins the Championship.
What is the lesson? A winning team is composed of
individuals working together and supporting each other so the strengths of
some support the weaknesses of others to achieve the desired results.
Obviously there lies the issue with the Dassault Rafale failure in Morocco,
the Dassault, DGA (Délégation Générale pour l'Armement ), MoD (Ministere de
la Defense) and MoE (Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances) team does not
work well together and Lockheed Martin's well-oiled F-16 international
machine is always ready to capitalize.
A typical bureaucratically-induced loss
King Mohammed and then President Jacques Chirac have
always been on close personal terms. Chirac was a good friend of
Mohammed's father and long time ruler, Hassan II who had purchased Mirage
F-1Cs from France in the 1970s at the time of the first prime ministership
of Jacques Chirac. In early 2006, King Mohammed and President Chirac
tentatively agreed on the purchase of a squadron of Rafale to counter the newly
delivered (Algerian) MiG-29SMTs and the soon to be delivered Sukhoi 30s.
The Algerian purchase has the potential to significantly alter the strategic
balance in North Africa and Morocco badly need to respond as the F-1s and
F-5s would soon be clearly dominated in any BVR engagement with the Algerian
Air Force.
Dassault prepared an offer for the Moroccan air force,
including current French Air Force inventory Mirage 2000s to be upgraded to
the -5 standard with new aircraft to be delivered at a later date. For
Dassault, this is a model than has proven successful with Brazil and would
allow the company to extend the production of 2000s a few more years in the
hope that India would decide to directly purchase an additional wing of
2000-5s. However, it emerges that the King remains firmly convinced that
Rafale is the best option for Morocco at this stage.
Done Deal
The Dassault offer is submitted in July 2006 for a total
price of $2.5 billion according to Les Echos, a hefty sum, if one considers that it only includes a
total of 18 aircraft. This would average about $140 million per aircraft,
well above the $70-$90 million price range generally estimated for Rafale, no
information is available to us to further clarify if any equipment, support
or training are included.The
Dassault pricing in this case does not seem to make much sense and could be
based on a customer budget figure rather than aircraft’s list price.
It is then that, unsurprisingly, the holes in the French
strategy begin to appear. Morocco contacts DGA, headed by former
Thales Avionics boss Francois Lureau, to discuss Rafale pricing. With
assistance from the French MoD, DGA provides pricing data based on existing
French air force Rafale contracts; one problem: the per aircraft price is
much lower than what Dassault has offered to the Moroccan Air Force, in the
area of $25 million less per aircraft. In Rabat and St Cloud, all hell
has broken loose and it becomes clear that there is no coordinated
commercial strategy in place between Dassault and the French government.
By the end of 2006, Les Echos states that the offer has climbed to $3.6
billion. France will now provide maintenance and spares for the Rafales as well as training and support. Financing becomes an issue
and Morocco is pressing France to lower the total package to a more
"reasonable" price; France reluctantly complies but no deal is finalized as
expected by early 2007. However, the bill remains too high for
Morocco, whose economy still greatly relies of phosphate production,
tourism and income from nationals living abroad. The Saudis then
intervene; Riyadh has just selected the Eurofighter Typhoon for its air
force and the close relation between Saudi Arabia and Morocco, a well-known
playground of the Saudi elite, emerges as the most likely solution to the
financing of the Moroccan Rafales.
Whether or not US influence in Saudi Arabia played a
role, it appears that in February of this year, the Saudis decide to
withdraw their financing offer. In the meantime, well aware of
Morocco’s financial situation, Lockheed Martin submits its first offer for
used F-16s to the RMAF. Still convinced that Rafale fully meets his
air force needs and not the F-16, the King confirms to Chirac that the deal
is still on.
Morocco then requests financing from the French
government, now in pre-election mode and thus partially paralyzed by the
uncertainties as to who might lead the country for the next five years.
Frustrated at the lack of responsiveness from Paris, King Mohammed now
considers other alternatives; Lockheed Martin has been trying to sell F-16s
to the country for years. In 1991, Morocco had seriously considered the
purchase of 20 ex-USAF F-16A/B (then at the time also funded by the Saudis
and the UAE). France had also made an offer for the Mirage 2000, which
included upgrades to its fleet of F-1CH/EH.
Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that France had been
"within an inch" of signing a contract in May and June for 18 Rafales in a
package worth $3.1 billion.We
also expected an announcement at Le Bourget and mentioned it in our aviation
today Webinar at the end of May.It never happened. In May-June, the new Sarkozy administration is in
full campaign mode (again) to win the parliamentary elections, the two
election rounds consume significant time and no doubt that it took the edge
of the French proposal for a while.
It is also in June that LMT’s proposal is getting
increased traction with the RMAF; no longer are used F-16s on the table but
24 brand new block 50-52 aircraft.Politically, the US offer is also very strong and no doubt
that the highest echelons of the current/past US administrations were
parties to the deal.The US
proposal also comes with assistance for anti-poverty programs and full
support for Morocco Western Sahara policy according to Moroccan sources.The offer is too good to ignore and the King gives his approval in
July. Late efforts from President Sarkozy in September do not reverse the
decision and Morocco publicly announces the deal at that time.
It appears clear that the French export systems failed
miserably in this instance.Clearly favored by the client, Rafale did not win because of
the absence of coordinated strategies between the parties that would play a
role in supporting the deal.
Bureaucratic inefficiencies, absence of customer focus, and possibly some
arrogance that Morocco was a done deal, and that Rafale could not possibly
lose to F-16.Well, it did.
October 2007
SAS and Bombardier: Years of Appeals Ahead Full
It finally happened, SAS has ditched the Q400. Not
really a surprise following the latest gear up event at CPH. The public
perception of the aircraft had reached such lows in Scandinavia that the SAS
board has taken a clearly logical business decision. The relation between
SAS and BBD was poor from the beginning, following a series of lemons and
what has been described as Bombardier's arrogance over the years. That
might be the correct thing to say from the victim's standpoint, in this case
SAS , but it does not hold water when one examines the good safety record of
the Q400 since entry in service in 2000. SAS will squarely lay the blame on
Bombardier for failing to update its maintenance guidelines, while the other
side will rightly point out that SAS is quite isolated with the type of
problems encountered by the aircraft over the past few weeks. We remain
convinced that the truth with all these problems probably lies between SAS
maintenance and Bombardier' suppliers QC and overall limited customer
support. Let's see if other Q400s develop similar symptoms soon.
California
Fires: When Politics and Special Interests Got in the Way of Public Safety
California has always been burning, and that has
nothing to do with global warming or Hollywood’s tendency to blow hot air on
anything it touches. It has been a high-risk state, ever since men set foot
in the Golden State (note: Golden, dry pale yellow grass, burns very well)
The point is, fires are nothing new there; whatever their size, frequency
and scope. Over time California’s population growth has removed the buffer
zone that once existed allowing damage to be contained to remote areas.
When combined with the ever regressing IQs of arsonists, who like nothing
more than to set nature on fire to satisfy their own twisted minds or
business interests you have a potent and deadly combination. Those criminals
are at the source of many fires, as it was the case during the Greek tragedy
this summer.
California has been slow and only partially effective at combating
fires from the air. The 1990s early 2000s was a period of near-complete
stagnation in terms of the state’s ability to draw up concrete long-term
plans regarding the future of its aerial tanker fleet. The S-2 acquisition
and modernization is perhaps the only positive accomplishment of CDF in its
effort to maintain a fleet of capable firefighting aircraft. However, as
the tragedy in progress has demonstrated, their aircraft can’t do the job
around the clock and are getting old. The WWII converted bomber mafia that
lobbied and to some degree paralyzed the modernization of air assets in the
US was sidelined to a large degree when several aircraft crashed while
fighting fires in several western states. Aging aircraft simply cannot
handle the rigor of the job year after year, and their crews sadly paid the
ultimate price.
LA County has leased Bombardier CL-415s from Québec for many years. While
the aircraft has proven its worth in Southern France, Italy, Greece and many
other places, no orders have yet emerged from California or other western US states
(Note: Minnesota DNR is a user)
that still prefer to use private contractors. The CL-415s has operational
limitations, but it far exceeds anything available on the market currently
in terms of payload, number of drops per hour and especially
maintainability/reliability. On top of that, it is built like a tank. Sure,
it may have some issues with high winds, but all aircraft do, especially the
old PBYs that once were used by private contractors and also the super DC-10
tanker, that definitely could not match it’s drop speed and precision (they
are very different aircraft built for different missions, so the comparison
stops here). On the other hand, if a CL-415, as its detractors love to
point out, misses a drop, it can return for another attempt relatively
quickly, unlike the S-2s or P-3s who need to return to base to refill their
tanks. This is a time consuming process when a fire needs to be quickly
contained because of high fire danger and proximity to urban areas.
Clearly, the 415s can be a very effective complement to the S-2Ts, and are
far more effective at interface firefighting, and studies have demonstrated
that scoopable water is available within ten miles of nearly all wild
land/urban interface areas in Southern and Northern California. CL-415s and
land-based tankers are both needed; however the CL-415 is the rapid
reaction, persistent tool needed by California to address this repeating
fire problem. A fleet of Cl-415s response time would be less than 15-20
minutes in most cases, and its ability to continuously and precisely drop
water in that ever narrowing buffer zones increasingly makes the aircraft a
must buy by CDF. Data has shown that a CL-415 can drop has much as 120,000
gallons in 3-4 hours mission, or in the area of 70-80 drops if scoopable
water is available close by. The $25 million per aircraft seems like money
well spent to ensure that those million dollars Malibu properties are
protected.
A380 again...
According to Flight International's Stephen Trimble, the USAF has requested
information about the A380 for an eventual recapitalization of the VC-25 and
C-5 fleets. As capable as the A380 might be, whether as a freighter aircraft
or as a VIP transport, the prestige associated with the VC-25 fleet in
particular and the callsign Air Force One, pretty much guarantees that
Airbus will never win the resulting political battle. The C-5 is
another issue altogether, and A380 might stand a chance there, even if only
a small one. A380 however lacks some of the features of C-5 and has
more limited cargo space which limits its ability to carry airframes such as
the CH-47.
USAF will need to have a solid case for this to even move forward. The
US is now in an election year, here is more ammunition for those who believe
that the US aerospace industry needs to be supported and not penalized for
its capabilities. This story will either drag well into 2009 and beyond or
simply fizzle. We do not remember if the French Air Force did or did
not give a call to Boeing for information about the 747 or 777 a few years
ago when they procured two A340s for their presidential fleet...
Looks like Toulouse was so eager to show off ahead of the Whalejet first
delivery that they posted aircraft interior promotional material
early. Some of the most interesting segments are now available at www.a380delivery.com. The first class suites are very impressive,
SQ is setting new standards in the industry. Economy class is,
well..., economy class.
This is a very important day for A380, after many years of arduous work,
Airbus deserves well earned congratulations for now.
First SQ commercial flight is scheduled for October 25.
