Daily G2 Solutions analysts news review now available at: http://g2globalsolutions.com/review/
June 2008
Now what?
GAO has spoken, but we are still no closer to a final resolution of
what is best described now as the tanker
soap opera.
While we felt the Boeing protest had indeed several merits on the
technicalities, we still believe a lengthy recompete is unnecessary and
might actually lead to further legal complications that would further
delay the delivery of these critical aircraft to USAF.
If there is indeed to be a recompete,
KC-30 remains the more capable
aircraft when compared with
KC-767.
However, some have hinted that Boeing would now offer the
777, which could be a very
attractive option to the customer, albeit perhaps too much aircraft for
the mission as currently defined by USAF. (Perhaps a reason or two why
777 was not offered in the first place).
Let’s not forget that the issue at stake here is goes beyond the
lucrative tanker contract and is actually an extension of the
Boeing-Airbus turf battle.
Some will now argue, and perhaps we share most of their feelings,
that Boeing won a political battle while not proposing a product to the
customer that could equal A330 mission performance... When one examines
the GAO decision, it remains clear to us that our evaluation of the
contest in December 2007
was indeed close, let’s look at the five criteria as presented by USAF:
Mission capability:
This is
the key criterion and USAF was reportedly not entirely clear with this
metric. If USAF decides to
rewrite those metrics, it might lead to more confusion and feed future
protests. However, it also
is clear that the customer perception of mission capabilities was
perhaps altered for the better during the competition.
While USAF might need to tweak this to reflect lessons learned, how it
will proceed with the evaluation will remove any doubts as to which
company has the better product.
Our view:
December: KC-30 Wins
Now: KC-30 wins the recompete
Proposal Risk.
USAF found that the two proposals had a similar level of risk.
Risk can be based on technical approach, estimated cost, teaming
arrangements and all factors that can intervene in the overall risk
perception.
Our view:
December: KC-767 Wins
Now: KC-767 wins the recompete
Past performance:
Boeing lost to the
Northrop Grumman-EADS team. The simplistic argument that Boeing has
built the majority of the current tanker fleet cannot be entirely used
as a past MOP. It appears that GAO had no significant issues with how
the Air Force applied this criterion.
Our view:
Now: Northrop Grumman
wins the recompete
Cost/price:
This is apparently where USAF made several mistakes with cost estimates
and life cycle costs. A
recompete will be instrumental in devising better cost measurements and
strategies. This is
Boeing’s Achilles heel in spite of public proclamations on A330’s
increased fuel consumption over the life of the weapons system.
Our view:
Now: Northrop Grumman wins the recompete
Integrated
Fleet Air Refueling Assessment:
Boeing will say that this was applied unrealistically.
However, USAF scenario modeling will remain classified for
obvious reasons and GAO is unlikely to have shed valuable insight.
Even if
IFARA modeling was partially
flawed, USAF’s response to GAO on the issue in May was perfectly
reasonable, and while numbers can be manipulated in favor of either
platform, realistic scenarios will be crucial, as they will demonstrate
that tanker ops in the pacific will require a longer range, heavier
aircraft such as KC-30 or KC-777.
What can USAF do now? Ignore GAO?
This perhaps would set a dangerous precedent going against the
best interest of future procurement processes.
Split the award between the two bidders? This option might eventually materialize. While involving
significant added costs, a split buy may have proven a way to avoid all
this government waste in the first place (see our January entry on the
topic).
The Boeing camp has won a significant battle, as we had mentioned
earlier in March, Boeing’s reasonable points have proven valid to GAO,
but again, those are technicalities with the procurement process,
nothing to do really with which aircraft is better suited for the
mission. USAF needs to move
quickly with a recompete and provide all resources necessary to announce
a final selection by end of 2008.
Neither Boeing nor Northrop Grumman should continue to receive
funding until a final decision has been made.

USAF B-2 Mishap Report and Accident Video
May 2008
USS Truman Temporary Residents
US Navy Video
A350 overweight, so what?
There is something fundamentally wrong at times with some elements of the media. A recent story in the German press claims that the A350 is about eight tons over initial weight targets. While this come as no real surprise to us, it however is not the weight problem that really is interesting, but the increasing voracity of the media to jump on any story for the sake of a story. News travel very fast in the internet age, and what was previously considered anecdotal is now positioned as news with little to no analysis or research behind it. As for A350, now 6-7 years from her entry in service, it is somewhat expected that initial designs would come higher than planned. If the aircraft is indeed suffering from weight issues, Airbus will now work with suppliers to find ways to meet more aggressive weight targets while making the necessary improvement with the aircraft carbon fiber fuselage barrel design. With oil hopefully at half its current price around 2015, aircraft weight might not be as critical as it is now... Time to take a longer term perspective, not just with 350, but also with C-Series, MRJ and the rest...

A reminder of what lies ahead for Airbus, Bombardier and Boeing...
It will take some time for the Chinese aerospace industry to get up to par with western standards and manufacturing efficiencies and procedures. However, G2 Solutions' experience with China leads us to suggest that the ramp up will accelerate, and that it will much faster than what some might have suggested in previous years. While we are not talking of dog years, we would not be surprised if China makes an attempt to develop that 150-200 pax aircraft by the end of next decade to propose a solution, albeit inferior to Airbus and Boeing's new narrowbodies. Even if by that time China is not able to compete on the same levels in terms of evolutionary technologies and especially will lag behind in terms customer support and service, price positioning will allow them to take some minimal market share away from Toulouse and Seattle in what we believe will initially be "political" purchases. With the Chinese government able to exert political and financial pressures on potential buying countries, the Chinese domestic market alone will support product growth, with the real threat materializing between 2025 and 2030. By that time, Alabama will look like a real nice place to live and work...

April 2008
Guessing Game...
With all the talk about Airbus and the GTF option for the 320 upgrade, here is a slide we put together early last fall to discuss some of the options available to the two major aircraft OEMs. Some of the terminology might have changed since, but it clearly highlights, in our opinion, that Airbus might have the upper hand as far as the timing of upgraded/new products. However, as we all know, what looks good and promising now might be an altogether different story in five years time. With an economic slowdown clearly affecting the market, Boeing might be able to delay the 737RS enough to match the new Airbus narrowbody innovations.

Northrop Grumman awarded BAMS contract
DoD Announcement:
The Department of the Navy announced today that the Northrop Grumman Corp. has been awarded the system development and Demonstration (SDD) contract for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System (BAMS UAS). The BAMS UAS contract award is the culmination of a year-long source selection process since the Navy received industry proposals in May 2007. The $1.16 billion cost-plus-award-fee contract is to develop a persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data collection and dissemination capability that fulfills the maritime war fighter's requirement for continuous battle-space awareness. The BAMS UAS will be developed using Northrop Grumman's RQ-4N platform. "This announcement represents the Navy's largest investment in unmanned aircraft systems to date. The extraordinary efforts leading to this announcement have helped the BAMS UAS program begin to develop a persistent ISR capability never before available to the fleet," said Capt. Bob Dishman, program manager for the BAMS UAS program. "This is a significant milestone for the BAMS UAS program, concluding a deliberate and meticulous source selection process that adhered to stringent Federal Acquisition Regulation and Naval Air System Command source selection processes and documentation requirements." The BAMS UAS is an integral part of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance Force. As an adjunct to the P-8A Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, the BAMS UAS will provide persistent maritime and littoral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to joint forces and fleet commanders worldwide. This capability will enhance battle-space awareness, improve force projection capabilities and protect and defend the fleet and the nation.
The Last of the Bandits
Today will mark the end of major era of military aviation history. F-117A will officially be retired at ceremonies at Holloman AFB and Palmdale, CA. The four ship flight will then head north to their original base on the Tonopah test range, in the North West corner of the Nellis Range. There, they will stored in the original hangars that were built in 1982 to house the first operational 117 squadron. With the entry in service of F-22A and other exotic new manned or unmanned platforms, the days of the Nighthawk were indeed numbered. Here are some of the individuals who had a significant role in the emergence of the first operational stealth aircraft in the world:
- Ben Rich, Lockheed Aircraft
- Denys Overholser, Lockheed Aircraft
- Dr William J. Perry, Former DoD Engineering Chief and later
Secretary of Defense
- Senator Samuel Nunn, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee
and many more...
Two KC-10s, the Moon and a PDLCT
This is not the title of a new Chronicle but rather an interesting airborne combination courtesy of NATO air forces joining in the skies over central Asia. The Mirage 2000D crew has got some interesting creative flair...Almost looks like those two USAF KC-10s are on their way to the moon.
It's a long Road...
There’s no question the elusive first Rafale export sale is getting closer and closer but the buyer seems to be changing every six months. Morocco collapsed last year, Libya emerged as the next likely buyer shortly thereafter, but since then things have gone very quiet. Russia has reportedly offered a deal to Libya for a squadron of Su-35 including a full weapons package. This could be an advantage since France has apparently not included MICA in the pending Rafale transaction. Recent information circulating in the French media is now suggesting that the UAE is at an advanced stage of negotiation with Dassault for the procurement of 20-30 Rafales to replace or complement its fleet of remaining Mirage 2000s (upgrades near completion) and 2000-9s (Bader 21 agreement). The deal could also involve the transfer of the 2000s to a potential buyer with India reportedly expressing strong interest. It however remains unclear as to which aircraft will be sold. Transferring the 2000-9s to India would be a strong signal that Delhi is leaning Rafale for the MRCA tender and is using the -9s as a bridge to Rafale since both aircraft share common modular avionics and some other systems, including part of the weapon system. To date India has only expressed interest in upgrading its 2000s to the -5 standard; procuring -9s would lead to a hybrid fleet of 2000s, however a switch to -9s could perhaps be on the table (the 2000-9 is a suped up -5, the type difference is not a stumbling block). It is also not clear if the UAE AF would decide to keep some of the newer -9s and sell the remaining aircraft to India. Judging by the recent announcement that France will have a permanent base in the UAE soon, this bit of news seems rather logical and perhaps represents the strongest Rafale lead since…ever. With the rumored announcement of a Greek AF buy for a squadron of Rafale reportedly imminent, this could be the year Rafale makes it to the big league.

Photo: Dassault Aviation
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GAO Report: Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
From GAO :
This report is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected weapon programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for major defense programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent from first estimates, compared with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have also often failed to deliver capabilities when promised. DOD's acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal, a condition that needs to be corrected given the pressures faced by the department from other military and major nondiscretionary government demands. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs, identifying potential risks when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs assessed--most of which are considered major acquisitions by DOD--were selected using several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also highlights overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative experience of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
The report can be accessed
here
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A few interesting articles have caught our attention lately. The first one, published in Airline Business is a remarkably rational piece from Doug Parr, Greenpeace's chief scientist. His point about biofuels cannot be contradicted; it's a fact, they will do more harm than good. The environmental zealots mafia litigation lobby now needs to come up with practical solutions besides "airplanes are bad", and moderate their (ideological not factual) view that global warming climate change is primarily due to business and commercial aviation growth. The solution lays with scientific research, and from our point of view, it begins with more aggressive MPG for every car in the Western World, a minimum of 35-40 MPG by 2015 seems reasonable enough.
Then there is this article in Human Events which raises a very troubling point if indeed correct. If, as suggested by the article, the Integrated Fleet Air Refueling Assessment (IFARA) model is partially flawed, this might have helped KC-30 and penalized KC-767. We do not have the details and the AF most likely has a reasonable explanation, but this could have some traction, though probably not enough to reopen the competition.
General Chuck Horner (USAF Ret) often brings clarity to complex situations. He proves it again with this (refreshing) piece for NR Online. We do not entirely agree with him about France's intentions vis a vis the CFM-56 engines. Commercial considerations and the fact that a good chunk of the A320s flying in the world since 1988 use that engine are the key reasons for France's "good behavior". Add to this the fact that the entire KC-135FR fleet in service with the French Air Force also uses the above mentioned engine. The list could go on and on.
The article can be found here

This week's edition of the Thud Factor is available here
Inside look into a RTO sequence (courtesy of a patient Airbus flight test aircrew)
March 2008


This week's edition of the Thud Factor is available here
Graham Warwick of Flight International recently listed this "bipartisan" blog about the tanker program. This site does little in terms of new and/or pertinent information. Still, we would "recommend" it as a read for those interested in trying to understand how some on the Hill and K Street are trying to influence or interpret Boeing's protest.
http://tankerblog.blogspot.com/

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and Foreign Policy Magazine Health and Future of the U.S. Military Survey Results
Very interesting & revealing read (click on image to be redirected to Foreign Policy's website)
It’s getting crowded
at the top
Gulftsream’s G650 announcement introduces yet another airframe at the
top end of the business aviation market. The range is an impressive
7,000 NM at .85 Mach and 5,000-NM at 0.9 Mach. This all looks very
good but speed costs money, and the DOC/hour of the G650 is
likely to be around the $3,500 mark (perhaps more).
Competition with the Global Express will be interesting, but might come
down to a matter of personal requirements, not necessarily comparative
aircraft performances. One of the most notable pieces of news coming out
of this announcement has to do with the selection of Thales for the
design of the Fly By Wire system, perhaps Bombardier will read the
signs here. Now Gulfstream can also work on their website loading
speed too…
Of Politicians, Tricycles and Professionals…
As the tanker saga continues we are tempted to drop the topic
from this blog altogether. However, comments we hear in the “news” media
and from Capitol Hill might give Jay Leno and Jimmy Kimmel some
interesting competition. In all seriousness, the storm is
gathering strength and the aftermath of the competition is seemingly
losing all elements of logical thinking. It is regrettable that the
Boeing protest is driven mostly by complaints related to technicalities
in the USAF selection processes. It looks increasingly like this is
being managed by a group of lawyers advising BA that the only way
to overturn the NGC win is to show how USAF made mistakes in changing
requirements during the competition. We are in no position to
judge if Boeing’s strategy has legal merit (we think it regrettably
might).
What is conspicuously absent from the whole debate, and especially from
the media comes down to this simple question: What is the
best aircraft for the warfighter to execute this strategic, long-term
mission (and give US forces an advantage when our Beijing friends get
their own tricycles over to Taiwan)? We have not heard a
single lawmaker ask the best for the warfighter question during
subcommittee hearings; Sue Payton was only there to face the so
predictable ire of congressmen “angry” from WA and KS (thou shalt rename
temporarily nameless here).
The way Ms. Payton handled some of our elected representatives’
questions (correction: posturing) deserves the Nobel Peace Prize or its
US equivalent since the previously nameless would probably complain that
the Nobel Prize is a threat to national security due to its high foreign
content and should be presented in the 6th district of the great State
of Washington.
Our sarcasm is noticeable because the protest’s banner holders have
contributed to Boeing’s (reasonable) questions causing the argument to
lose any logical sense and defensibility. Weak arguments, short-term
political needs and emotional temper tantrums are a common thread.
Boeing’s case, and we believe that some of the points raised by Mark
McGraw have merits, now needs to be handled by professionals that can
re-ignite a rational and defendable case for the 767. Who
better but USAF to do this? They (and Boeing) need to tell the
non-Boeing crowd to tone down, as the rhetoric will get them nowhere.
Similarly, Northrop Grumman needs to keep a lid on dubious claims
suddenly doubling the number of incidental jobs created by KC-45A; the
tit–for-tat is frankly getting a little old. The best
of the media reporting about the KC-45 aftermath can be found
here,
here and
here.
Those are the professionals that deserve some attention.
What we find interesting is that Boeing is seriously pointing to the
many risks with the production model (multiple sites, multiple partners)
that NGC is planning for KC-45A. When one looks at the many
problems encountered by an even more decentralized program like 787, one
may wonder why Boeing chooses this line of criticism. It is
regrettable that criticism toward KC-30 often omits the name
Northrop Grumman from (surprisingly) inferior selective reporting
such as CNN’s Lou
Dobbs. Northrop Grumman is one heck of a great American
organization and how they managed to trump the equally great American
Boeing Company speaks volumes about the strength of their tanker
strategy. Case closed.
ISTAT and the unanswered questions
John Leahy is a brave man. He has, for better or worse,
become the official voice of Airbus for many years and thus has earned,
deservedly at times ("The 7E7 is not a threat"), but not most
of the time, his fair share of criticism. Most recently, he has
been right on the money when he indicated that about 27% of recent
commercial orders are “on shaky grounds”. We said 25% last summer,
but again, that was before the credit bubble of August. However,
it is reasonable to question his recent point as reported by
Flight here “People are "smoking something" if they say we
really need to come up with a new narrowbody sooner than now being
projected”. Is there any truth behind his statements or does
this need to be filed into the Leahyism section?
2017 is a long time; airlines such as Air France and a few others would
have ideally liked a new generation narrowbody aircraft by 2012.
Airbus suggestions that they might have to wait until 2017 earliest is
indicative of two things: either Airbus is ready to introduce a
320NG that can serve as a bridge to the new narrowbody or Toulouse is
now engaged in not so subtle disinformation warfare.
As far as engine technology is concerned, GTF is likely to remain the
best choice; we believe that propfans have too many risks (speed,
certification…) and unknowns associated with airline operations that
basically outweigh the benefits. We feel Boeing will launch its
replacement narrowbody aircraft first as the 737NG will not be easily
upgradeable, unlike the A320, and thus has entered its downward product
cycle. 737 will have to go by 2014. Competition will
intensify for Toulouse and Everett and it will come from Montreal and
may be from San Jose (and partner(s)?) if rumors are indeed correct.
A Desjardins Securities analyst recently hinted at a 150 pax C-Series,
and we believe this is a likely development for the yet to be officially
launched new Bombardier aircraft. The C-Series has a serious
window of opportunity that may extend from 2014 to 2017 if Airbus and
Boeing decide to postpone their new narrowbody introduction to market.
What is the opportunity for a 130-155 pax C-Series? If
Bombardier hits its market window it will be in direct competition for
an addressable market estimated at 3,500+ aircraft…
Now if you wonder why we keep mentioning tricycles, see the first
cartoon below.
Friday 4 PM humor (follow hyperlinks below by clicking on image)
J.D. Crowe Mobile Register Mar 12, 2008 |
Click
here to view
Eric Devericks
Seattle Times
March 13, 2008

The February 29 Earthquake
The dust has settled; is
this the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end?
Familiar words indeed, yet we cannot be but surprised at the immensely
logical decision our Department of Defense announced yesterday Feb. 29.
The Northrop Grumman team win is a slap in the face to conformism, petty
protectionism, pork and short-term business considerations. With the
benefits of hindsight, most of the signs were already there.
In 2004, I spoke at a conference in Los Angeles, and made the so predictable call that Boeing would win the tanker program and anybody even thinking EADS had a shot was out of his/her mind. I even offered to pay for dinner at one of the most expensive Georgetown restaurants if it did happen. A couple of years later, my offer was off the table and so was my thinking that Boeing could engage cruise control and win KC-X. The EADS team, and its new partner Northrop Grumman, had just put one very strong offer on the table and my conversation(s) with the crew at the Alabama economic development office impressed me in terms of the KC-30 team’s vision and motivation. To the end I would have favored a split award; it appeared to be the most logical decision from the end user standpoint, although it probably would have been cost-prohibitive to develop two types concurrently.
We have expressed our
view in this blog that a KC-X win for EADS-Northrop, whether a split or
sole source, would have tremendous consequences for the US based
aerospace industry. For the first time in decades, our country
would witness an expansion of its large airframe production facility
footprint as a result of the KC-30 team win. The opportunities created
by this win are many and could eventually have positive consequences for
Boeing and its customers. A shake up at Boeing is likely, now the game
is afoot, and Northrop Grumman plans as an EADS gateway into the US
market will grow. With A330F coming to Mobile, we expect the partnership
to work on future programs, including the new A320RS and perhaps
pitching the A400M to the US military sometime in the middle of the next
decade. Boeing now needs to reexamine its internal decision making
processes and understand that old strategies no longer works in this
global market driven by the ever-changing concept of “best value”.
Boeing’s loss is
regrettable, because of its impact on the Everett, BFI and Wichita
workforces in particular (although the job losses figures used by
opponents to the NGC-EADS team are grossly exaggerated). KC-767, although not as capable in many
areas as KC-30, is still a product that could have served USAF very
well. Information will slowly emerge, but we believe that
classified scenario modeling showed USAF that KC-30 was better suited
for future engagements and added much-needed airlift strategic
capabilities. That alone was probably the deciding factor in the
selection of the KC-30. The information and measurement criteria
were reserved to USAF and the bidding teams and thus will remain
classified for years. Economic considerations, price and other
elements were important but did not appear to have been the primary
deciding factors.
Was
price a deciding factor? Of course, but Boeing should have been
able to easily match any EADS offer in that regard. If not the case,
then this was a serious mistake. Steve Trimble gives us a
pretty good idea of price and its impact in the DEW line.
KC-30 is a like the Big
One in California. It is not a matter of if the quake will happen
but when. Well, it happened on February 29, and it signals a departure
in DoD thinking where best value has triumphed over pork and the
business-as-usual mentality. The strategic implication for the
occidental aerospace industry is also clear. Note my use of the
word occidental. I, for one, believe strongly that a rapprochement
between the European and US aerospace industries is not only desirable
but also required to counter emerging Asian capabilities and support
both continents defense budgets. To rethink our agreements and
bury our differences will be necessary if our common industries are to
remain competitive through 2020 and beyond. Failure to partner and
engage in joint programs will only leave our industries vulnerable,
reduce innovation capabilities, affect NATO’s ability to operate and
adversely impact our ability to remain globally competitive. Let
me be very clear, the Airbus vs. Boeing battle is nothing compared with
what our aerospace industries will face from China and others in the
future.
For the Boeing worker on
the floor in Everett, this prose may be interpreted with pessimism and
categorized as a complete misunderstanding of the realities faced by
American workers today. The sentiment of abandonment and betrayal
are probably very real and completely understandable. However, for
future generations of Aerospace workers in America and Europe, this deal
signals that our government customers are now prepared to address and
intervene directly to put an end to our industrial base rate of
departure.
Boeing
cannot reasonably argue that KC-767 was the all American solution (75%+
US content).
KC-30 perhaps has a lower US content (60%+) but the loss is bitter because it
comes so close after years of tension with France and Germany in
particular. Regardless, American companies are going to benefit
tremendously from this deal, from engines to avionics to maintenance, so
the argument that America lost and France won is “null and void”.
Perhaps Boeing failed to
take risks. This is where Northrop Grumman CEO Ron Sugar needs to
be commended for taking the initiative to go after this deal with a
solution many ridiculed at the time. Going with a mostly
Franco-German product for DoD on the back end of one of the most serious
diplomatic crisis in US-EU relations was a risky gamble that paid off.
Did Boeing also fail to
measure the impact of the KC-30 in the mind of the customer? I
think USAF came to KC-30 with little or no knowledge of the aircraft and
its capabilities, and as the competition progressed it became clear that
KC-30 better suited the mission. This also was our perception at
G2 Solutions. The more we looked into the value propositions of
both teams, the more value we began to see emerging from the KC-30
product.
Now what can Boeing do? Should they protest or will they be forced into protesting by the usual, yet logical, political pressure of a few? If Boeing is to protest, they must not do so because they know they might be able to reverse DoD’s decision with support from the Hill. Boeing should now think hard about whether or not it can change DoD’s mind based on the KC-767’s merits. In our opinion, KC-30 has won once, and would win again in a recompete scenario. Boeing was reluctant to throw 777 into the KC-X fight and this might have been why they lost. The footprint and other “best fit” arguments have been tossed back at Boeing with the KC-X decision and USAF’s underlying message to Everett has been that institutional inertia and risk aversion lead to failure. Boeing’s decision to continue selling a 767 airframe solution perhaps better suited to U.S. allies than its own DoD is in short a colossal failure of vision. Such shortsightedness is not limited to Boeing, but to all, including we who had predicted Boeing would win outright or at least garner (in G2’s case), a portion of KC-X.
Loosing KC-X is a bitter pill to swallow for Boeing and for Washington State; despite the monumental denial of cash, its impact on Boeing's Everett operation should be minimal in the short term. This is certainly not the gloom and doom that many in the industry or in the sensationalist politico-media complex have incorrectly described. Boeing, as an aerospace organization, is doing very well for the foreseeable future and with 787 issues being resolved rigorously, the KC-X loss will motivate and help the company refocus and develop stronger competitive offerings in the future.mmerluzeau@g2globalsolutions.com

The Thud Factor: Keeping Track of US DoD Spending
February 2008
Week Ending 2-29-2008

Tanker Award
Announcement Tomorrow,Thursday,
Friday at 1700 Eastern
Northrop Grumman awarded KC-45A contract
Full Pentagon Press Conference
Transcript
Boeing Protest unlikely to overturn
decision.
Boeing statement:
We were just informed that our KC-767 Advanced Tanker proposal was not
selected in the KC-135 Replacement Program known as KC-X.
Obviously we are very disappointed with this outcome. We believe that
we offered the Air Force the best value and lowest risk tanker for its
mission. Our next step is to request and receive a debrief from the Air
Force. Once we have reviewed the details behind the award, we will make
a decision concerning our possible options, keeping in mind at all times
the impact to the warfighter and our nation.
The Boeing Company would like to thank the many people who helped us
in this campaign. We have received tremendous support from our
suppliers, elected federal/state/local leaders, unions, community
groups, and the 160,738 men and women who work for Boeing.
Northrop Statement:
February 29, 2008—Northrop Grumman announced today that it has been
selected by the U.S. Air Force to provide the KC-45A aerial refueling
tanker for the KC-135 tanker replacement program. The Air Force’s KC-45A
is based on the highly-successful A330 commercial airframe, produced by
EADS.









Tanker Award: Only a matter of Politics?


Seems like our Russian friends have found ways to discreetly ship surplus Tarentul Missile boats courtesy of the Norwegian sealift vessel M/V Eide. Destination: Vietnam. The value of airborne maritime patrol assets clearly illustrated by this find from a French Navy Dauphin Helicopter. The M/V Eide had previously been used to ship the Canadian Submarine HMCS Chicoutimi back to Halifax NS in 2004 following a fire during its first cruise shortly after departing Faslane Naval Base in Scotland.





KC-X: Split buy chances are increasing

V-22’s deploy to theater, and finally a chance to prove a touted transformational USMC force-projection capability
I had a conversation with a friend the other day, who happens to have been an active duty Marine. We have a number of conversations – some enlightened, some not so. He has a love for all things rotary wing, so naturally over time our talks turned to the Osprey and the roughly 25-year path this aircraft has taken to Iraq. I received word shortly thereafter from another source that the V-22 was in theater, replete with this picture of the Thunder Chickens of USMC Tiltrotor Squadron 263.

I sent this image, and here was the snippet of our conversation that followed:
RS: “Did you get that email and picture I sent you about the first Marine V-22 unit to arrive in theater?
USMC Friend: “Haven’t seen it yet, but was it a picture of the V-22, with the Marines in the windows screaming ‘Save us!”
His comment was flippant but concise. From reading the USMC/rotary wing blogosphere one can see comments of serious concern about the Osprey. From an outsider’s perspective, the Osprey is a bit of an acquisition contradiction for the Marine Corps, a service that has traditionally eschewed long lead times, budget busting programs (through FY 2006 more than $20 billion spent DoD wide) and exotic, minimally-proven concepts. At times the Osprey was said to encompass up to 70 percent of the entire Marine Corps acquisition budget.
The blogosphere comments seem to hinge on a perceived lack of defensive armament, autorotate inability and doubt regarding the Osprey’s ability to take battle damage and continue its mission. The Ospreys currently deployed will rely on a single flex-mounted 7.62 mm machine gun, manually operated only when the rear door is open. The Marines plan to acquire some 360 Ospreys, while the Navy and Air Force currently plan to buy 100 more combined.
The Osprey aims to bring with it ability to self deploy, and the following performance information from the Osprey Web are indeed impressive:
Performance
Max Cruise speed (MCP), SL, kts (km/h) : 241-257 (446-476) Max R/C, A/P Mode, SL, fpm (m/m) : 3,200 (975) Service ceiling, ISA, ft (m) : 24,700 (7,529) OEI Service ceiling, ISA, ft (m) : 10,300 (3,139) HOGE ceiling, ISA, ft (m) : 5,400 (1,646)
Mission radius with aft sponson tank
Land-Assault Troop Mission (24 Troops), nm (km) : 242 (448) Pre-Assault Raid, nm (km) : 267 (495)
Mission radius with wing tanks
Land-Assault Troop Mission (24 Troops), nm (km) : 233 (432) Pre-Assault Raid, nm (km) : 306 (567)
We also have word that BAE Systems is attempting to fast track a retractable, automated GAU-17 7.62 mm belly gun for the V-22. The gun is intended to provide 360-degree suppressive fire. The system is dubbed the Remote Guardian(TM) System (RGS), and BAE is attempting to have it available for installation in Q3, 2008. Adding the RGS system to the V-22 after deployment flight testing and systems development invites issues not limited to: weight, center of gravity, flight characteristics, range, speed, payload and when and how (in the flight envelope) the gun can be deployed. Currently the RGS is designed to provide fire throughout the V-22 flight envelope. The demands from the V-22 user community must have been intense in order to bring the RGS to the fore this late in the game.
The elimination of the autorotation requirement is in concept offset by the Osprey’s ability to use altitude and lift characteristics to glide to a belly landing, although it is tacitly acknowledged this maneuver is dicey at best at altitudes below 1,700 feet.
The Osprey became an object of focus in the course of G2 research into Department of Defense spending on the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul of Aircraft Structural. The Osprey caught our attention for all the same reasons we’ve now seen in a Time Magazine cover story, although the timing and tenor of the Time article seems at best coincidental and at worst opportunistic. I am no apologist for the V-22, but this story could have run anytime in the past four or five years replete with the same cogent points on budget, capabilities, accidents that have claimed the lives of 30 people and a flight testing regimen that has come under criticism for being truncated and/or falsified.
The degree to which the V-22 delivers on its promises will soon become apparent, but we at G2 Solutions believe the V-22 will have continuing teething problems, equal to or greater than any new weapons system deployed to a hostile theater of operations. In this respect G2 Solutions is led to believe that the DoD’s current fleet of CH-47, CH-46, CH-53 derivatives and other rotary-wing transport/assault assets will continue in use and importance, in spite of plans to replace portions of operational responsibilities with the V-22. If G2 Solutions is correct, the DoD will have to continue its impressive on-the-fly regimen of in-theater or stateside repair, maintenance and recapitalization of these vital assets beyond current timelines.
The Osprey would seem now to have a chance to prove its detractors wrong, to prove that this aircraft can be truly transformational, enabling a force projection and protection capability not currently offered by the workhorse CH-46 Sea Knight and CH-53 variants in the Navy/Marine Corps.
Godspeed to the Thunder Chickens.
Comments or questions for the author: rstearns@g2globalsolutions.com
Shin-shin is here
Japan is making very good progress with three critical programs, C-X, P-X and FS-X. The latter driven in particular by its aging F-4 and F-15 fleets and current export restrictions with the F-22A. FS-X, now ATD-X has been on the table for about eight years and it emerges now that some serious work has been ongoing to possibly field the aircraft by the second half of next decade, especially if the US does not release F-22A to Japan. Whether or not the ATD-X will move beyond the technology demonstrator phase remains primarily a matter of politics. Japan is increasingly likely to grow its indigenous defense industry and rely less on US systems in the future.
The rise of China also poses a critical problem from a political standpoint in particular, with the Japanese military wanting to increase domestic sourcing, or at least diversify them to avoid too much reliance on US suppliers. With China gaining political influence in the US, the long standing ties between the Japanese military and the US defense industry might begin to show some cracks soon. However, building a domestic 5th generation fighter aircraft will be a challenging task for Japan, but definitely not an insurmountable one; especially with the (expensive) experience gained with F-2. In the meantime, the JASDF needs to procure interim fighters to replace the F-4EJ KAI early next decade. The competition between the F-18E/F, Eurofighter, Rafale and F-35 will be interesting and perhaps could go to Eurofighter judging by the strong interest expressed by the JASDF for the aircraft. Here is a look at the ATD-X courtesy of Fuji News Network, nice aircraft.
France vs. France or when Rafale loses again
Fighter Export Success Depends on Aircraft
and Sales Team
Performance
Chinese Grand Prix 2007: Britain's sensational rookie
Lewis Hamilton is about fifty laps away from becoming the first driver to
win the formula one championship in his first year. Two hours later, a
combined team and driver mistake has seen his championship lead shrink by
seven and four points over his two rivals. Two weeks later in Brazil,
Ferrari's Kimi Raikkonen capitalizes and wins the Championship.
What is the lesson? A winning team is composed of
individuals working together and supporting each other so the strengths of
some support the weaknesses of others to achieve the desired results.
Obviously there lies the issue with the Dassault Rafale failure in Morocco,
the Dassault, DGA (Délégation Générale pour l'Armement ), MoD (Ministere de
la Defense) and MoE (Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances) team does not
work well together and Lockheed Martin's well-oiled F-16 international
machine is always ready to capitalize.
A typical bureaucratically-induced loss
King Mohammed and then President Jacques Chirac have
always been on close personal terms. Chirac was a good friend of
Mohammed's father and long time ruler, Hassan II who had purchased Mirage
F-1Cs from France in the 1970s at the time of the first prime ministership
of Jacques Chirac. In early 2006, King Mohammed and President Chirac
tentatively agreed on the purchase of a squadron of Rafale to counter the newly
delivered (Algerian) MiG-29SMTs and the soon to be delivered Sukhoi 30s.
The Algerian purchase has the potential to significantly alter the strategic
balance in North Africa and Morocco badly need to respond as the F-1s and
F-5s would soon be clearly dominated in any BVR engagement with the Algerian
Air Force.
Dassault prepared an offer for the Moroccan air force,
including current French Air Force inventory Mirage 2000s to be upgraded to
the -5 standard with new aircraft to be delivered at a later date. For
Dassault, this is a model than has proven successful with Brazil and would
allow the company to extend the production of 2000s a few more years in the
hope that India would decide to directly purchase an additional wing of
2000-5s. However, it emerges that the King remains firmly convinced that
Rafale is the best option for Morocco at this stage.
Done Deal
The Dassault offer is submitted in July 2006 for a total
price of $2.5 billion according to Les Echos, a hefty sum, if one considers that it only includes a
total of 18 aircraft. This would average about $140 million per aircraft,
well above the $70-$90 million price range generally estimated for Rafale, no
information is available to us to further clarify if any equipment, support
or training are included. The
Dassault pricing in this case does not seem to make much sense and could be
based on a customer budget figure rather than aircraft’s list price.
It is then that, unsurprisingly, the holes in the French
strategy begin to appear. Morocco contacts DGA, headed by former
Thales Avionics boss Francois Lureau, to discuss Rafale pricing. With
assistance from the French MoD, DGA provides pricing data based on existing
French air force Rafale contracts; one problem: the per aircraft price is
much lower than what Dassault has offered to the Moroccan Air Force, in the
area of $25 million less per aircraft. In Rabat and St Cloud, all hell
has broken loose and it becomes clear that there is no coordinated
commercial strategy in place between Dassault and the French government.
By the end of 2006, Les Echos states that the offer has climbed to $3.6
billion. France will now provide maintenance and spares for the Rafales as well as training and support. Financing becomes an issue
and Morocco is pressing France to lower the total package to a more
"reasonable" price; France reluctantly complies but no deal is finalized as
expected by early 2007. However, the bill remains too high for
Morocco, whose economy still greatly relies of phosphate production,
tourism and income from nationals living abroad. The Saudis then
intervene; Riyadh has just selected the Eurofighter Typhoon for its air
force and the close relation between Saudi Arabia and Morocco, a well-known
playground of the Saudi elite, emerges as the most likely solution to the
financing of the Moroccan Rafales.
Whether or not US influence in Saudi Arabia played a
role, it appears that in February of this year, the Saudis decide to
withdraw their financing offer. In the meantime, well aware of
Morocco’s financial situation, Lockheed Martin submits its first offer for
used F-16s to the RMAF. Still convinced that Rafale fully meets his
air force needs and not the F-16, the King confirms to Chirac that the deal
is still on.
Morocco then requests financing from the French
government, now in pre-election mode and thus partially paralyzed by the
uncertainties as to who might lead the country for the next five years.
Frustrated at the lack of responsiveness from Paris, King Mohammed now
considers other alternatives; Lockheed Martin has been trying to sell F-16s
to the country for years. In 1991, Morocco had seriously considered the
purchase of 20 ex-USAF F-16A/B (then at the time also funded by the Saudis
and the UAE). France had also made an offer for the Mirage 2000, which
included upgrades to its fleet of F-1CH/EH.
Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that France had been
"within an inch" of signing a contract in May and June for 18 Rafales in a
package worth $3.1 billion. We
also expected an announcement at Le Bourget and mentioned it in our aviation
today Webinar at the end of May.
It never happened. In May-June, the new Sarkozy administration is in
full campaign mode (again) to win the parliamentary elections, the two
election rounds consume significant time and no doubt that it took the edge
of the French proposal for a while.
It is also in June that LMT’s proposal is getting
increased traction with the RMAF; no longer are used F-16s on the table but
24 brand new block 50-52 aircraft. Politically, the US offer is also very strong and no doubt
that the highest echelons of the current/past US administrations were
parties to the deal. The US
proposal also comes with assistance for anti-poverty programs and full
support for Morocco Western Sahara policy according to Moroccan sources.
The offer is too good to ignore and the King gives his approval in
July. Late efforts from President Sarkozy in September do not reverse the
decision and Morocco publicly announces the deal at that time.
It appears clear that the French export systems failed miserably in this instance. Clearly favored by the client, Rafale did not win because of the absence of coordinated strategies between the parties that would play a role in supporting the deal. Bureaucratic inefficiencies, absence of customer focus, and possibly some arrogance that Morocco was a done deal, and that Rafale could not possibly lose